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IN THE UTAH COURT OF VPPr

STATE OF UTAH,
( i

rhiiiilirf'/AppclU'c,

Nn >niinn^|7 ( \

v.
JUAN QUITERIO PEREZ,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

" \H CODE ANN. § 76-6-203 (1999), and attempted criminal homicide, a
second Jegree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (1999). This Court
has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)0) (1996).

1. Is any error in instructing I In- |iirv on the depraved indifference
ill11 n.ilive for attempted criminal homicide harmless, absent any evidence that
'' ', ilimit ticti".! u/i'.U V
.' MM '.'.!'.'. •.'.'.'.•.'. '."('.'"I'/t'.i'.i! ,.,.l.'.',.l.('.1.'. s'.'.1.',1.'.'
erroneous decision \\\ ,i 111,iI i i MM I i inim! icsull in reversible error unless the
error is harmful."' State v. Piansia..„ne, 954 P.2d 861, 870 (Utah 1998) (quoting State
v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah • °n^ss '"Harmless error is an error that is
sufficiently inconsequential that llic.. .

^j^:....

.:..

outcome of the proceedings. Put differently, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of
a different outcome is sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence in the verdict.'"
Id. at 870-871.
2. After defendant objected that the State failed to give notice that Officer
Wathen would testify as an expert, did the trial court plainly err in not sua sponte
ordering a continuance?
Because no continuance was requested below, defendant cannot prevail on appeal
absent a demonstration of plain error on the part of the trial court. To establish plain
error the appellant must show that an enror exists, the error should have been obvious to
the trial court, and the error is harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah
1993). If any one of these requirements is not met, plain error is not established. Id. at
1209.
3. Did the trial court plainly err in not declaring a mistrial based on its own
conduct?
Defendant raised no objection to the tenor or demeanor of the trial court's rulings
and comments below. Therefore, as with the previous issue, the plain error standard
applies.
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4. Dia the trial court abuse its wide sentencing discretion by imposing
co iisecutive sentences for the aggravated burglar

d attempted homicide

convictions?
I |i « I i
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I mi
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discretion of the court." State i J *etei son, bbl P.2d 1J109 1219 (Uta
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"chweitzer, 943 P.2d 649. 651 (Utah \pi
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in not overturn
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* ordingly, the appellate
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clearly excessive, or imposed without considering all legally relevant factors
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885, 887 (Utah 1978)).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

nminai
imrder if the actor:
*va) intent.ui.a-' v or Knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another commits an act
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidence a depraved indifference to human
life engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby
causes the death of anotherf.]

3

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-l7-l3(4)(a) (1999):

If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of this
section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial or
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony.
Utah R. Evid. 611(a):
Control by court The court shall exercise reasonable control over the
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to
(1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment
of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect the
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, and
attempted murder, a second degree felony (R. 2-4). Following a two-day jury trial held
on 18-19 April 2000, defendant was convicted as charged (R. 320-321). The trial court
sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of five-years-to-life for the aggravated
burglary, and one-year-to-fifteen years for the attempted murder (R. 332-333).
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 334). The case was transferred to
this Court from the Utah Supreme Court on 4 August 2000 (R. 354).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant broke in to 65-year-old Ellen Kuhel's apartment and violently assaulted
her in her hospital bed with a knife (R. 3 59:191). In the weeks prior to the attack,
defendant repeatedly told Ellen she was "dead meat," in apparent retaliation for her
asking him not to smoke marijuana outside her bedroom window (R. 359:49-51).

4

"/ heard him say that they was going to stab me"
On 9 August 1999, at about 12:30 a.m., Ellen was in her bed when she heard
someone outside her bedroom window state that "they" were going to "stab" her (R.
359:47, 70). She then heard someone come through the kitchen window (R. 359:47, 52,
67). Ellen thought to herself, "This is it" (R. 359:52).
The next thing Ellen knew there was someone in the bedroom: "I real quick said
- - trying to put him off guard I said, 'What are you doing in my bedroom, Robert?'" (R.
359:52).l The intruder hesitated long enough for Ellen to swing her legs down off the
side of the hospital bed in which she slept (R. 359:53). Ellen suffers from diabetes, a
damaged spine and other chronic illnesses (R. 359:64). By the time the intruder reached
her, Ellen was sitting up in bed facing him (id.). He attacked and struggled with Ellen,
leaving her with several lacerations on her right scalp, under her right eye and on the
right shoulder and breast area (R. 359:53-54,191-192). Ellen exclaimed, "Help me.
Jehovah, help me," and "kicked with everything [she] had" (R. 359:54-55). Ellen was
not able to scratch or otherwise strike her assailant because she "had to hold his hands
with [her] hands to keep him from stabbing her" (R. 359:87).
"[TJhey stabbed me"
The assailant immediately ceased the attack and fled down the hall to the front
door (R. 359:55-58). Finding that he was unable to open the locked the door, the

Robert is Ellen's son who shared the two-bedroom apartment with her (R. 359:).
5

assailant grabbed a nearby chair and used it to climb out the kitchen window (R. 359:5558, 88). Ellen screamed to her son, "Robert, they stabbed me" (R. 359: 59). She also
called the police (id.).
Ellen was not able to identify her assailant that night (R. 3 59:101). She did,
however, tell Officer Holdaway that her assailant "smelled" like a "Hispanic guy" she
had had problems with in the past (R. 359:102).
"You are dead meat"
In addition to having confronted defendant about the smell of his marijuana, Ellen
had another confrontation with defendant about one week prior to the burglary and attack
in her apartment. Specifically, a group of Hispanic people, including defendant, gathered
around a truck with a camper shell parked near Ellen's bedroom window (R. 359:61-62)
(see Exh. #6). Some of the people lived in the same fourplex as Ellen and defendant,
while others did not (R. 359:93-94). Ellen heard some of the men in the group telling
two girls "what they were going to do and who they were going to do it with and they
weren't using nice language" (R. 359:62). Specifically, "[t]hey told the girls they was
going to have intercourse and who they was going to have it with . . .[o]nly that's not the
words they used" (id.). The girls screamed, "No," and "bawlfed] for awhile instead of
leaving" (id.). This behavior continued for 3-4 hours before Ellen screamed out her
bedroom window, "If you don't cut it out and stop that filthy language and let me rest for
a minute, I'm going to call the police" (id.). Ellen opened her curtain and saw that "they"
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were "pelting little tiny gravel rocks" at her window (id.). Defendant said to her, "You
are dead meat" (id.).
Defendant's Fingerprints Found inside Ellen's Apartment
Officer Wathen processed the crime scene that night (R. 359:110-121). He spread
magnetic powder to detect latent fingerprints at the point of entry, Ellen's kitchen
window (R. 359:121). Although he found nothing of use on the kitchen counter, he did
find fingerprints that "jumped right out" on the ceramic tiles below the window (R.
359:123). He also found fingerprints on the kitchen window itself: "I saw a great set of
prints on there that even without fingerprinting powder I could see had ridge detail on
them" (R. 359:125-126) (see Exh. ##1-2). When asked if there is a difference between a
fresh latent print and an older print, Officer Wathen explained that, based on his fifteen
years experience, "when a print is fresh or recent, they seem to just jump out. There is
very fine, ridge detailing. You can see the - - it is called 'minutia/ the lines" (R.
359:114-115,135,155). Officer Wathen confirmed that the two sets of prints that he
took "popped right up" (R. 359:155).
Officer Burgon examined the latent prints found in Ellen's apartment and
determined that they belonged to defendant (R. 359:203-207, 209) (see Exh. ## 1-2).
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Defendant Admits Breaking and Entering the Apartment
Detective Norton interrogated defendant at the Salt Lake County Jail on 5 October
1999 with the assistance of two interpreters (R.360:220-223). The interrogation was
recorded, but Det. Norton inadvertently erased the first portion of the interrogation,
where defendant waived his Miranda rights, when he forgot to turn the tape over before
using it again (R. 360:224) {see Exh. ##15-16 (microcassette and cassette recording of
partial interrogation) {see also R. 359:167-168, 174-175). Det. Norton had the partial
recording transcribed (R. 360:223) {see Exh. # 3) (a copy is contained in addendum A).2
Defendant denied ever being in Ellen's apartment or assaulting anyone, until the
subject of fingerprints was brought up (R. 360:227, 236). Then defendant admitted that
he had been in the apartment approximately one and one/half months earlier, or about the
time of these offenses, but claimed that the apartment was empty of persons and/or
furniture (R. 360:227-228-231, 236).3 Defendant said he entered through the kitchen
window and that he then unlocked the front door for a prostitute he had solicited {id.).
According to defendant: "They went in there, did their thing and that was i f {id.).
Defendant admitted knowing it was illegal to break in to the apartment to have sex with a
2

Defense witness Martha Hannan, a contract linguist, prepared the transcription of
the interview that appears in Exh. #3 (PL. 260:255). Hannan agreed with the prosecutor's
statement that her transcription was an accurate interpretation of the interview (R.
360:264).
3

While defendant claimed the apartment was empty when he entered it one and
one/half months earlier or approximately mid-August, Ellen had been living there since
April 1999 (R. 359:44) (R. 360:269).
8

prostitute, but denied having anything to do with the attack on Ellen (R. 360:241). The
interpreter's recall of defendant's statements was consistent with that of Det. Norton's
(R. 359:176-178, 186).
Defendant denied ever having a confrontation with Ellen or hanging around the
camper parked behind the fourplex, but he admitted that he knew who Ellen was (R.
360:230, 235, 242). He also admitted that he used to live at the fourplex (R. 360:236).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point L The crime of attempted depraved indifference murder does not exist in
Utah. Nonetheless, no reversible error occurred in including an instruction on the
depraved indifference alternative for the attempted murder because neither party
presented evidence suggesting the attempted homicide was committed with less than an
intentional mental state. Accordingly, the jury was also instructed on the alternatives of
attempting to intentionally and knowingly causing the death of another, and attempting to
cause serious bodily injury, committing an act clearly dangerous to human life.
Moreover, the only issue at trial was identity. There is, consequently, no reasonable
possibility that defendant was convicted of the nonexistent crime.
Point II. The Trial Court did not commit plain error in not sua sponte ordering a
continuance and/or excluding Officer Wathen's opinion as to whether a one-year-old
fingerprint would "pop up," where after complaining that he was not given notice that
Officer Wathen would testify as a fingerprint expert, defendant failed to request either
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remedy. Indeed, defendant suffered no harm because Officer Wathen's opinion as to the
freshness of the prints found was merely cumulative of other unobjected to evidence.
Point HI. The trial court did not plainly err in not declaring a mistrial based on its
own conduct. Defendant fails to establish any error, let alone obvious error, in the trial
court's management of the witness interrogations. In any event, the final jury
instructions cured any possible error and/or prejudice resulting from the trial court's
remarks here.
Point IV. The record discloses that the trial court properly considered all the
statutory requirements before exercising its wide sentencing discretion to impose
consecutive sentences for defendant's aggravated burglary and attempted homicide
convictions. The consecutive sentences should therefore be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ANY ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE DEPRAVED
INDIFFERENCE ALTERNATIVE, FOR ATTEMPTED MURDER
WAS HARMLESS BECAUSE NEITHER PARTY PRESENTED
EVIDENCE SUGGESTING THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED
WITH LESS THAN AN INTENTIONAL MENTAL STATE
In State v. Huston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993) (per curiam), the Utah Supreme
Court reversed a conviction for attempted second degree murder because the jury was
instructed on attempted depraved indifference murder, a crime the supreme court had
previously determined did not exist in Utah. Id. (citing State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843
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(Utah 1992)). In Point I of his brief, absent any discussion or comparison of the facts of
this case to those in Huston, defendant asserts that the same result should obtain here.
Aplt. Br. at 25-26.
Defendant is correct that instructing a jury on the non-existent crime of attempted
depraved indifference murder is error. However, giving an incorrect attempted depraved
indifference instruction may be harmless error. See State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 988, 991992 (Utah App. 1993). The facts of the instant case establish that Tinoco, not Haston,
controls, and the error here was harmless.
Proceedings Below. The State charged defendant with attempted criminal
homicide, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (1999)
(R. 3) (emphasis added) (a copy of the information is contained in addendum B). The
information specified that "defendant, [], a party to the offense, attempted to intentionally
or knowingly cause the death of Ellen Kuhel" (id.).4 Although the information did not
include the depraved indifference alternative, and the State did not rely heavily on that
alternative as a theory of prosecution in its closing argument (see R. 360:286, 290), it
was nonetheless included in the elements instruction for attempted criminal homicide,
and was also defined in two other instructions (R. 304-308) (copies of pertinent jury
instructions are contained in addendum C), over defendant's objection (R. 360:281).

4

While subsections (a) and (b) of section 76-5-203 require an intentional or
knowing act, subsection (c), the depraved indifference alternative, merely requires a
reckless act. See Tinoco, 860 P.2d at 991-992.
11

A.

This Case is Not Haston Revisited Because Unlike
Defendant, Haston Acted With Less Than an Intentional
Mental State

This Court has previously distinguished Haston on the same grounds that it is
distinguishable here. See Tinoco, 860 P.2d at 991. Unlike Tinoco and this case, there
was evidence that Haston acted with less than an intentional mental state. Specifically,
Haston shot his victim "in the chest at close range during a drunken quarrel" Haston,
846 P.2d at 1277 n.l (emphasis added). Therefore, the evidence in Haston would have
supported a conclusion that, "while [Haston] did not intend or know his actions would
cause death, firing a gun during a drunken quarrel was a reckless act." Tinoco, 860 P.2d
at 991. "Thus, it was possible Haston was convicted of a nonexistent crime." Id.
B.

This Case is More Properly Analogized to Tinoco Because
Both Defendant and Tinoco Acted Intentionally

Like defendant, Tinoco tried to rely on Haston in claiming that his conviction
should be reversed. Tinoco, 860 P.2d at 991. Like Haston, the facts of Tinoco's case
also involved drinking; specifically, Tinoco was drinking beer with two buddies in his
home when he shot one of them in the arm. Id. at 989. However, unlike Haston, Tinoco
claimed that he did so in self-defense. Id. According to his victim, on the other hand,
"he (the victim) was leaving the house, believing [Tinoco] and [the other man] were
going to fight, when [Tinoco] deliberately shot him." Id. Tinoco was charged with
attempted criminal homicide, but was convicted for the lesser included offense of
aggravated assault. Id.
12

On appeal, Tinoco argued that "the trial court failed to appropriately instruct the
jury on the need for an intentional or knowing mental state to find him guilty of assault
under one subsection of the statue." Id. Tinoco further argued that as a consequence, the
instructions allowed the jury to convict him of reckless attempted aggravated assault, a
nonexistent crime. Id. This Court pointed out, however, that Tinoco "admitted that he
did the act necessary to constitute assault, i.e., he intentionally shot the victim, though he
claimed in self-defense." Id. at 992. Therefore, "[o]n the uncontested facts, and the
instructions on the law given to it, the jury could not have convicted [Tinoco] of an
assault under the attempt section, but rather necessarily convicted him under [] the
completed act section." Id. Thus, the Court concluded there was no "reasonable
possibility" that Tinoco had been "'incarcerated for a crime which is not recognized in
Utah.'" Id. (citing Haston, 846 P.2d at 1277).
This case is more analogous to Tinoco than to Haston. As in Tinoco, there is no
"reasonable possibility" that defendant was convicted for a nonexistent crime, in this
case attempted depraved indifference murder. The evidence established solely
intentional misconduct, with no hint of a lesser mental state. Specifically, after Ellen
confronted defendant about smoking marijuana outside her bedroom window, he
frequently told her she was "dead meat," and he subsequently broke into her apartment
and attacked her in her bed with a knife (see, e.g., R. 359:49-59, 62, 78, 123-126, 203207). Defendant's defense was not about mental state, but identity (see, e.g., R. 360:291-
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317). Ellen's testimony established, and defendant did not dispute, that her attacker
acted intentionally. The only real issue for the jury was whether that assailant was
defendant (R. 360:291-317). Based on Ellen's identification and the fingerprint
evidence, the jury convicted him as charged (R. 321).
Based on the evidence adduced, no facts even a "theoretical possibility of a
conviction for a legally impossible crime." Tinoco, 860 P.2d at 992. Thus, the Court
should reject defendant's claim of Haston-type reversible error.5 See also State v.
Payne, 964 P.2d 327,333 (Utah App. 1998) ("[Reversal is inappropriate when, for
example, compelling evidence supports the defendant's conviction.").

defendant's nominal reliance on State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1159 (Utah
1991), is as unavailing as his reliance on Haston. Johnson involved a conviction for
attempted first degree murder. Id. The problem in Johnson was that the evidence as to
one of the aggravating circumstances elevating the conviction from second to first degree
murder was insufficient and the jury verdict did not specify upon which aggravating
circumstance its first degree verdict was based. Id. at 1157-1159. The supreme court
reiterated the Utah rule that, "a jury must be unanimous on all elements of criminal
charge, and that a general verdict of guilty cannot stand if the State's case was premised
on more than one factual or legal theory of the elements of the crime and any one of
those theories is flawed or lacks the requisite evidentiary foundation," and accordingly
reversed Johnson's conviction. Id. at 1159.
As set forth in the body of this point, in contrast to Johnson, the only issue here
was the identity of the perpetrator and the evidence accordingly supported only one
theory, i.e., intentional attempted homicide. Thus, there is no possible confusion as to
whether the jury could have convicted based on a inadequate theory or factual basis.
14

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN
"FAILING" TO ORDER A CONTINUANCE WHERE, AFTER
COMPLAINING THAT HE WAS NOT GIVEN "NOTICE" THAT
OFFICER WATHEN WOULD TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT,
DEFENDANT FAILED TO REQUEST ONE
In Point 11(A) of his brief, defendant contends that the trial court erred in "failing"
to order a continuance after defendant objected on "notice"grounds to the prosecutor's
attempt on redirect to elicit Officer Wathen's opinion on the tendency of a one-year-old
latent fingerprint to "pop up." Aplt. Br. at 36-37. In Point 11(B) of his brief, defendant
contends that the trial court erred in "failing" to exclude the officer's opinion. Aplt. Br.
at 37-39. Defendant acknowledges that the plain error standard applies at most to his
claim that the trial court should have ordered a continuance sua sponte. See Aplt. Br. at
36-37. As neither remedy was requested below, however, defendant cannot prevail on
appeal absent a demonstration that the trial court plainly erred in "failing" to order either
a continuance and/or exclusion sua sponte. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09
(Utah 1993). Therefore, because defendant fails to assert the plain error standard with
respect to his exclusion claim, that issue is waived and will not be further addressed here.
See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to address waived
issue in the absence of any assertion of plain error); State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 705
n.2 (Utah App. 1993) (same).
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Proceedings Below. On direct examination of Officer Wathen, who collected the
latent fingerprints from Ellen's kitchen, the prosecutor inquired, without objection: "Is
there a difference between, say, a latent print that is fresh versus something that might be
older in time?" (R. 359:114, 121-126) {see Exh. ##1-2). When Officer Wathen
responded affirmatively, the prosecutor further inquired, without objection, as to the
officer's "opinion"on that difference (id.). Officer Wathen responded that a "fresh print"
has a "crisp" appearance, meaning, "'It pops u p . . . I guess the easiest thing to explain is
that when a print is fresh or recent, they seem to just jump out. There is very fine, ridge
detailing. You can see the - - it is call 'minutia,' the lines."(/i/.). The prosecutor then
asked, without objection, whether a one-week-old fingerprint would be considered an
"older print" (id.). Officer Wathen replied that it was all "relative" and that it would be
possible to produce "some level of quality" (R. 359:115). He also reiterated that in his
"experience . . . the most recent fingerprints have very fine details and they pop right out"
(id.).
After establishing the difference between fresh and old prints, the prosecutor
inquired regarding the prints found in Ellen's kitchen (R. 359:121-123). Officer Wathen
described the prints he found on the ceramic tiles below the kitchen window: "And as I
went along, there was one particular fingerprint that just - - it just jumped right out. The
only way I can describe it is it looked as if I took my own finger and put it on and pulled
it away and hit it with a brush. It just came right up" (R. 359:123). Officer Wathen also
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described the fingerprints he found on the kitchen window itself: "I took my flashlight,
held it up to the window at an angle, and, again, boy, I saw a great set of prints on there
that even without fingerprint powder I could see had ridge detail on them" (R. 359:126).
On cross, defense counsel inquired further about "fingerprints that jump out" (R.
359:132). Specifically, defense counsel stated: "You talked about fingerprints that jump
out, and I take it there are fingerprints that don't jump out at you. But the fact of the
matter is that fingerprints can last a long time somewhere; correct?" (id.). Officer
Wathen agreed (R. 359:133). Further cross examination established that prints can
conceivably last "years" on hard surfaces such as glass and tile (id.). Defense counsel
then delved into the subject of prints "'jumping out/ 'popping out'":
DEFENSE COUNSEL:

You talked a little about some - -1 want to stay on the
subject for a second of- - of this 'jumping out,'
'popping out,' I think is what you said?

OFFICER WATHEN:

Yes, sir.

DEFENSE COUNSEL:

I take it that your notions of freshness are sort of
subjective?

OFFICER WATHEN:

Define that, please?

DEFENSE COUNSEL:

They are based on your experience, your perceptions.
Something seems to happen with that dust that makes
you think, 'Yeah, that's a good print'?

OFFICER WATHEN:

Well, normally, when I go to process a scene,... for
an example in a vehicle burglary,... we will check
certain areas, the doors and that, and when we don't
find any fingerprints, we start to ask ourselves - usually I do this on every case - - 'Why don't I find
any?' So I will find a spot on a vehicle or in a
residence or wherever and I will roll my own fingers
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on that, and then I start to check it. And that's when I
refer to - - that the 'prints popped right up,' it has been
my personal experience, I always see that occur under
those circumstances.
You can recover fingerprints off items that are very,
very old; however, normally you don't use this
fingerprint powder technique. Normally it is with an
alternate light source or maybe a flourescent powder
and took [sic] a photograph, and then it's reversed
and/or maybe a digital type thing like this. What I was
speaking [sic] is normally with a powder, whether it's
volcanic or bichromic, which is just a different
variation of powder, they seem - - and it's just been
my personal experience that they normally are very
pronounced and they just jump right out.

DEFENSE COUNSEL:

Since you are talking about the moisture interplay,
condensation may make them seem light or may make
the powder stick and make them jump out; fair to say?

OFFICER WATHEN:

Very. Yes.

DEFENSE COUNSEL:

And when we are talking about this period of time - and, like you say, sometimes you might want to use a
different technique if you think you are looking at a
real old print; right?

OFFICER WATHEN:

Well, normally what I try to do is always use the least
intrusive means - -1 should say the second least
intrusive, first being photograph where you don't
disrupt or touch anything. You try to use the normal
fingerprint powders, just the regular volcanic, what
call "bichromic"; because it's just simple to apply, you
put the powder on your brush and you go over the
print, you either get it or you don't.
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If you can see that you have a print there and - - but
you are not getting the results you want because it is
not adhering to the print because maybe it is old and
there is no more moisture in it, then you want to go to
one of the alternate means to recover that or capture it.
DEFENSE COUNSEL:

So you could try others after if you weren't
successful?

OFFICER WATHEN:

You would be negligent if you didn't.

DEFENSE COUNSEL:

Okay. Fair enough. You were successful with the
first method that you used; right?

OFFICER WATHEN:

Yes, sir.

(R. 359:134-136) (emphasis added).
On redirect examination, the prosecutor sought to clarify, without objection,
whether the sets of prints lifted from Ellen's kitchen {see Exh. ##1-2) "popped right up?"
(R. 359:155). Officer Wathen responded affirmatively (id.). The prosecutor then
inquired whether it was Officer Wathen's experience and training that a one-year-old
print would "pop up?", drawing the first objection to this line of inquiry from defense
counsel (R. 359:155-156). Defense counsel objected on grounds of "foundation" and
lack of "notice" that Officer Wathen "would be an expert on the time and place of the
fingerprints" (id.).
The trial court denied the objection, ruling that Officer Wathen had been
established as an expert (id.). Defense counsel agreed, but persisted that defendant did
not get "notice that the State would attempt to make such a conclusion with this witness"
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(id.). The trial court responded: "It was gone into, was it not, the question of 'pop up'
was gone into on cross-examination?" (id.). Defense counsel stated that he had done so
"[b]ecause it was elicited on direct, yes, Your Honor, only to clarify it" (id.). The trial
court overruled the objection (id.).
Thereafter the prosecutor elicited Officer Wathen's opinion that a one-year-old
print would not "pop up . . . as quickly and as pronounced as it did in this particular
occasion" (R. 359:157).
A.

The Trial Court Committed No Error, Let Alone Obvious
Error, in "Failing" to Order Unrequested Relieif

As noted previously, in Point 11(A) of his brief, defendant asserts that he was
"surprised" when the prosecutor attempted to elicit Officer Wathen's expert opinion as to
whether a one-year-old print would "pop up." Aplt. Br. at 27-37. Defendant contends
that he was therefore entitled to a continuance under the expert witness notification
statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-17-13(4)(a) (1999), and that the trial court committed
plain error in not ordering a continuance sua sponte. Aplt. Br. at 36-37.
To establish plain error defendant must show "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellantf.]"
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. Failure to meet any one of the requirements defeats
defendant's claim. Id. Here, defendant's plain error claim fails because he cannot
demonstrate any error on the part of the trial court.
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In the absence of a timely request for any relief defendant is hard-pressed to
demonstrate that the trial court should have ordered a continuance sua sponte, and that
the "failure" to do so was error, let alone obvious error. Indeed, "[wjhen the prosecution
introduces unexpected testimony, a defendant 'essentially waive[s] his right to later claim
error' if the defendant fails to request a continuance or seek other appropriate relief under
Rule 16(g)[, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure]." State v. Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518, 522
(Utah App. 1998) (quoting, State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1989)). See also
State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1169 n.2 (Utah App. 1998) (noting the similarity
between discovery claims raised under section 77-17-13, and Rule 16(g)).
Here, the expert witness notification statute does indeed require the State to give
at least 30 days notice before trial of any expert witness. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1713(l)(a) (1999). While such notice was provided with regard to Det. Burgeon, it was not
provided with regard to Officer Wathen's opinion here {see R. 159). Further, section 7717-13(4)(a) of the statute does provide that "[i]f the defendant or the prosecution fails to
meet the requirements of this section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a
continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony."
Contrary to defendant's suggestion, however, subsection (4)(a) does not mandate
that the trial court shall order a continuance any time the discovery statute is violated
even if no continuance is requested by the aggrieved party. Id. Indeed, there are many
reasons an aggrieved party may not desire a continuance, and subsection (4)(a) does not
place the onus of divining the aggrieved party's strategy on the trial court. Id. In the
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present case, for example, defense counsel acknowledged that he had explored the
unobjected-to "pop up" testimony on cross examination for clarification purposes (R.
359:156) (see also R. 359:132-137).
If defendant truly desired a subsection (4)(a) continuance, he should have timely
requested one for the reasons he articulates for the first time in his appellate brief. See
Aplt. Br. at 30. Had defendant argued such circumstances when the prosecutor first
broached the topic of Officer Wathen's expertise in detecting the freshness of a latent
print on direct examination {see R. 359:114-115), he may have arguably sufficiently
demonstrated his entitlement to a continuance. See, e.g., State v. Tolano, 2001 UT App
37, f 3, 11-14,

Utah Adv. Rep.

(holding that trial court abused its discretion

when it denied Tolano's requested continuance); State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530
(Utah App. 1997) (recognizing that "[t]he decision to grant or deny a requested
continuance lies within the broad discretion of the trial court[,]"and holding that trial
court exceeded its discretion in refusing to grant the requested relief).
Based on the above, precisely because defendant failed to seek a continuance, or
"to devise any means of dealing with [Officer Wathen's] unexpected testimony,"
Rugebregt, 965 P.2d at 522, any resulting error may well have been invited. See State v.
Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah 1996) (holding that parties should be discouraged
from intentionally misleading the trial court "so as to preserve a hidden ground for
reversal on appeal"). See also Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220 ("A party cannot take advantage
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of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the
error.").6
B.

Defendant Suffered No Harm Because Officer Wathen's
Opinion was Merely Cumulative of Other Unobjected-to
Evidence

Even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in not sua sponte ordering a
continuance, any possible error was harmless because the complained of evidence is
merely cumulative of other previously admitted and unobjected-to evidence. See, e.g.,
State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah App. 1997) (rejecting claim of prejudicial
error and recognizing that defendant waived any right to an instruction limiting jury's
consideration of his statements for impeachment purposes where defendant's statements
had also been admitted in the State's substantive case-in-chief without objection).
In claiming prejudice, defendant attacks Officer Wathen's response to a single
question on redirect, that a one-year-old print would not "pop up" as "quickly" and as
"pronounced" as had the instant prints {see R. 359:157). See Aplt. Br. at 27-37.
However, this evidence had essentially already been admitted. Indeed, defendant did not
raise his "notice" objection until after the difference between fresh and old prints had
been explored without objection by the prosecutor on direct and initial redirect (see R.
6

If the need for a sua sponte continuance order should have been obvious to the
trial court, it should have also been obvious to trial counsel. See State v. Labrum, 881
P.2d 900, 906 (Utah App. 1994) (observing that a "claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel typically is raised in conjunction with alleging plain error," because if "the error
was plain to the court, it should also have been plain to trial counsel"), overruled on
other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996). However, defendant makes no claim that
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a continuance or any other relief.
See Aplt. Br. at 27-37.
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359:114-115, 123, 125-126,). By the time the time defendant objected to the
prosecutor's query on redirect, whether a one-year-old print would "pop up," the
unobjected-to evidence established that fresh prints "pop up," and that the prints found in
Ellen's kitchen "popped up" (R.359:l 14-115, 123-126, 155). In other words, they
appeared as if Officer Wathen himself had just placed them there (R. 359:123).
Cross examination further clarified that older prints are not generally detected
with dusting powder, and that Officer Wathen succeeded in lifting the prints in Exh. ##12 with dusting powder, suggesting they were not old (R. 359:134-136). Cross
examination also established that prints can conceivably last "years" and delved into the
environmental conditions under which prints would and would not "pop up" (see R.
359:132-136).
Finally, as defendant admitted to breaking into the apartment approximately one
and one/half months prior to his October 1999 statement to Det. Norton, or at the
approximate time of the burglary and attack (see R.360:227-228, 231, 236 ), the
prosecutor's focus on the difference between a recent and a one year old print was barely
relevant.
Based on the above, Officer Wathen's opinion on redirect, that a one-year-old
print would not "pop up" like the instant prints, was merely cumulative of previously
adduced and unobjected-to evidence, including the officer's observation that the
fingerprints popped up so clearly that it was as if he himself had just made them.
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Given these circumstances, defendant fails to show any harm and his plain error claim
can be rejected on that ground alone. See State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313,317 (Utah
1998).
POINT HI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN NOT
DECLARING A MISTRIAL BASED ON ITS OWN CONDUCT
In Point IV of his brief, defendant claims that the trial court "disproportionately
criticized defense counsel's handling of the trial," as compared to the prosecutor, as well
as interjected comments and asked questions designed to bolster prosecution witnesses
and undermine a defense witness. Aplt. Br. at 40-44. Therefore, defendant broadly
claims, he is entitled to "retrial before a new judge." Aplt. Br. at 47. Defendant
acknowledges that he failed to raise any objection to the tenor of the trial court's alleged
unfair conduct below, but suggests that he was not obliged to do so as any objection
would have been "futile or vain,"and also "would have simply entrenched and agitated
the trial judge." Aplt. Br. at 45-46.
Alternatively, defendant asserts that the trial court's alleged unfairness was so
"obvious" as to constitute plain error. Aplt. Br. at 46. As defendant's suggestion that he
can escape the requirements of the plain error standard because he is challenging the trial
court's conduct is unfounded, the State's analysis proceeds solely under that standard.
The cases defendant cites do not support his suggestion that an appellant attacking
the conduct of the trial court is excused from otherwise applicable preservation
requirements. For example, Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892 (Utah App. 1996) (Billings,
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J. dissenting), cert, denied, 936 P.2d 407 (Utah 1997), is an adoption case where the
majority determined the putative father was ''statutorily precluded from maintaining any
action to assert any interest in the child, based on his failure to file a notice of paternity in
this State." Id. at 895. The dissent, upon which defendant relies, merely observes that as
the putative father had filed an action in another state, and had otherwise informed the
mother and LDS Social Services of his desire to have custody of the child, a late filing of
the notice would have been futile. Id. at 900 (Billings, J., dissenting). Further, Roundy
v. Staley, 1999 UT App 229, 984 P.2d 404, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999),
involves a discovery issue where the plaintiff moved to compel the disclosure of the
witness and other evidence pretrial, which motion the trial court "unequivocally denied."
Id. at ^[6. In a split decision, a single judge deemed the motion to compel sufficiently
analogous to an admissibility objection as to render further objection at trial "futile." Id.
(Greenwood, J., lead opinion). Finally, State v. Eldredge, 713 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah), cert,
denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989), recites the plain error requirements and the underlying
purpose of the doctrine, and notes no exception thereto for challenges to the trial court's
conduct.
As previously set forth in Point [I, to establish plain error defendant must show
"(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome[.]" Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. Failure to meet any one of the requirements
defeats defendant's claim. Id. Here, defendant's allegations of impartiality fail to
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demonstrate any error, let alone obvious error, in the trial court's management of the
witness interrogations. Moreover, any arguable error was cured by the trial court's
instructions to the jury.
A.

The Trial Court Committed No Error, Obvious or
Otherwise, in Managing the Witness Interrogations

Defendant cites approximately 30 instances in the record where the trial court
interrupted either the prosecutor or defense counsel, but complains that a
disproportionate number of these interruptions (19) reflected unfairly on defense counsel.
Aplt. Br. at 40-41. Specifically, defendant claims the trial court "objected to defense
counsel's handling of witnesses" and otherwise "rushed defense counsel" through his
examinations. See Aplt. Br. at 40-41. However, defendant discusses only two of the
cited 19 incidents in his brief, one of which occurred outside the presence of the jury.7
7

See Aplt. Br. at 41 (citing R. 360:278-280), where defendant complains that the
trial court told defense counsel to "get on with it" after defense counsel informed the trial
court he had more objections to the jury instructions. The full exchange proceeded as
follows:
DEFENSE COUNSEL:

. . . Your Honor. With regard to the elements instruction of
Attempted - -

THE COURT:

Let's have the Jury brought in.

DEFENSE COUNSEL:

There are a few more.

THE COURT:

Well, let's move it on, then. We are kind of fumbling around
here. You are - - you need to make your exceptions so we
can get on with it.
(R. 360:280) (emphasis added). Viewed in context, the trial court's comment was not
entirely directed at defense counsel. Moreover, because it was made outside the presence
of the jury, even assuming it was unnecessarily brusque, the comment cannot be said to
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The other allegedly unfair incident defendant highlights from his string cite of 19,
is the trial court's relevancy ruling which precluded defense counsel from eliciting
testimony from Officer Holdaway, during the State's case-in-chief, regarding prostitution
activity in the vicinity of the crime scene. Aplt. Br. at 43 (citing R. 359:108). The
exchange between defense counsel and the trial court went as follows:
DEFENSE COUNSEL:

Some prostitution in that general part of the city?

THE COURT:

I don't see where that is relevant, Counsel.

DEFENSE COUNSEL:

It is, Your Honor

THE COURT:

Prostitution?

DEFENSE COUNSEL:

Yes, Your Honor, and the fact that this case involves the
statement of the Defendant that when he was in the
apartment, he was in there engaging in an act with a
prostitute.

THE PROSECUTOR:

Judge, again, if Counsel is asking him about that, if we are
not close to this time frame, I would object to the bases - -

DEFENSE COUNSEL:

Let me ask -

THE COURT:

I don't see any relevance to it, Counsel. I am going to sustain
the objection. I don't think that - the Defendant can tell his
story when he gets an opportunity, I suppose.8

DEFENSE COUNSEL:

Corroborate -

have prejudiced defendant and will not be fiirther analyzed here. See Marvin, 964 P.2d
at 317 ("If there is no prejudice, we have no reason to reach the other elements of the
(plain error) analysis"). See also State v. Jasper, 759 So.2d 1136, 1139 (Miss. 1999) (no
reversible error where trial court's actions were outside the presence of the jury).
8

Defendant complains for the first time on appeal that this was an improper
comment on his right to testify. Aplt. Br. at 44-45. However, any arguable error or
prejudice was cured by the jury instructions discussed in subpoint (B) supra.
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THE COURT:

/ am not persuaded at this point that there is any reason to go
into prostitution in any portion of the city.

DEFENSE COUNSEL:

I am only trying to establish whether or not - -

THE COURT:

I understand what you are trying to establish.

DEFENSE COUNSEL:

- - happens there.

THE COURT:

I am ruling that it's inadmissible, inappropriate.

(R. 359:108-109) (emphasis added).
In addition to his complaint about the trial court's alleged unfair tenor in
delivering the above ruling, defendant complains that the trial court substantively erred in
precluding him from introducing relevant evidence to corroborate his defense theory, i.e.,
that he left his fingerprints in Ellen's apartment during an earlier, unrelated, illicit entry
to have sex with a prostitute. Aplt. Br. at 44. As can be seen from the ruling itself,
however, defendant was not entirely precluded from adducing corroborative evidence of
prostitution activity in the area. The trial court's statement, "I am not persuaded at this
point" (R. 359:108), reasonably suggests that it might have been amenable to this line of
inquiry during presentation of the defense case. In any event, the corroborative value of
such testimony is negligible. Whether defendant was able to solicit the alleged prostitute
locally, or whether he brought her back to the fourplex from another location, the more
salient and undisputed fact was that defendant lived in the same fourplex as Ellen at the
time of these offenses (R. 359:93-94; R. 360:236).
Defendant highlights two other incidents which are not included in his record
string cites on pp. 40-41 of his brief. Specifically, defendant complains that after defense
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counsel asked for a bathroom break, the trial court responded, "We'll grant a favor to
Counsel this one time .. . Ten minutes, Mr. Williams[,]" see Aplt. Br. at 41 (quoting R.
359:109), and that the trial court instructed the interpreter to wait to finish interpreting
the jury instructions for defendant until after he had interpreted the closing arguments
then underway, see Aplt. Br. at 41 (citing R. 360:283-284).
One of the difficulties faced by counsel and the Court in analyzing defendant's
claims of impartiality in these and the other complained of incidents is that the tenor of
the trial court's conduct is not obvious from the cold record. Moreover, because
defendant did not object to the tenor of the court's comments below through either a
mistrial or new trial motion, the trial court had no opportunity to rule on the tenor of his
conduct. Further, adverse rulings by themselves do not necessarily indicate bias or
partiality. See State v. Davis, 607 N.E.2d 543, 546 (Ohio App. 1992). The result is that,
defendant's claims to the contrary, on this record the highlighted incidents above more
obviously illustrate the trial court's warranted concern about "avoiding] needless
consumption of time." Utah R. Evid. 611(a) ("[t]he court shall exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as
to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth,
(2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or
undue embarrassment").
The undiscussed record cites on pp. 40-41 of defendant's brief describe equally
benign judicial conduct. Specifically, the incidents complained of in those cites involve
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nothing more than the trial court's clarifying defense counsel's questions for the benefit
of the witnesses, and/or the witnesses' responses for the benefit of defense counsel {see,
e.g., (R. 359:75-76, 142-143, 152) (R. 360:235, 241, 247, 266)).
In addition to clarifying the proceedings, the rulings in the undiscussed record
cites are not clearly adverse to defendant. For example, one of the cites consists of the
trial court interrupting to remind a prosecution witness what question defense counsel
was asking, after the witness's lengthy response strayed from the point {see R. 359:160).
Even defense counsel acknowledged that several of the trial court's interventions were
"Fair enough" or "Fine" {see, e.g.,R. 360:235, 247, 251). Further, while the trial court
sustained one of the prosecutor's "leading" objections, he did so by summarizing the
witness's testimony favorably to defendant's theory {see R. 360:258). Defense counsel
accordingly responded affirmatively: "And that is just what I was going to try to get her
to say, Judge. So, if that is the state of the evidence, I am fine with moving on" (id.).
Finally, the trial court also overruled the prosecutor's "asked and answered"objection to
defense counsel's cross examination (see R. 359:182-183).
The above incidents are examples of the trial court's "firm control"of the
proceedings, and they all "fall well within the reasonable bounds within which a trial
judge may act." Cooper v. United States, 403 F.2d 71, 73 (10th Cir.1968) (upholding
conviction where trial court characterized defense counsel statement as "ridiculous," and
questioned the relevancy of defense counsel's cross-examination of a government
witness).
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Even if the trial court can be fairly characterized as unnecessarily curt at times,
such curtness is insufficient to establish any error. Indeed, while "[jjudicial decorum and
restraint are always goals, [] comments which cause disappointment, discomfort, or
embarrassment to counsel in the presence of the jury, without more, rarely constitute
deprivation of a fair trial." People v. Coria, 937 P.2d 386, 391 (Colo. 1997) (upholding
conviction over challenge to trial court's "unnecessary" response to defendants objection
to prosecutor's closing argument: "Counsel, you know that's proper. You're just
objecting to interrupt his flow and your objection is overruled."). See also United States
v. Welch, 745 F.2d 614, 621(10th Cir. 1984) (although the court's comments were "brusk
and disturbing" to counsel, the matters mentioned were but "minor incidents" not
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985);
United States v. Rosen field, 545 F.2d 98, 103 (10th Cir. 1976) (no error when trial court
interrupted defense closing argument to correct what appeared to be an improper
argument and then admonished defense counsel in the presence of the jury), cert, denied,
430 U.S. 941 (1977).
Defendant's allegations of unfair bolstering of prosecution witnesses and
undermining of a defense witness are similarly meritless. Aplt. Br. at 42-43. Contrary to
defendant's allegation, no bolstering is apparent in the trial court's response to defense
counsel's "foundation" and "notice" objection to Officer Wathen's testifying as an expert
(R. 359:156). Indeed, the trial court ruled as follows:
Well, Counsel, I believe that the gentleman's qualifications have been
established that he is aware of and has done numerous fingerprint analyses
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or at least crime-scene analyses. And I'm persuaded that he's able to give
his opinion with regard to print viability after a period of a year or any
other time period after that. He can answer.
(id.). The trial court's ruling is nothing more than preservation of the basis for his ruling,
not to mention a proper characterization of the disputed issue: whether, in the words of
defense counsel, Officer Wathen was qualified to testify as an expert "on the time and
place of the fingerprints" (id.) (emphasis added).
Defendant also complains that the trial court unfairly bolstered the interpreter,
Agent Earnst, when at the conclusion of the agent's testimony on direct, the trial court
remarked: "He happened along, offered a good deed which has not gone unpunished;
has it, Agent?" (R. 359:179). See Aplt. Br. at 42. Notably, defense counsel played upon
the trial court's good humored observation when he began his cross examination of the
agent: "As part of that good deed, did you take any notes?" (id.). The trial court's and
defense counsel's comments amount to no more than "trivial pleasantries]," and in no
manner constitute error, let alone, obvious error on the part of the trial court. State v.
Keenan, 689 N.E.2d 929, 944 (Ohio) (characterizing trial judge's reference to prosecutor
in the presence of the venire as a "rising star" as a "trivial pleasantry" and holding that
such "could hardly be plain error"), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 860 (1998).
Defendant's allegation that the trial court undermined defense witness Martha
Hannan is equally lacking in merit. The trial court merely asked Hannan (who testified
that the language skills of the two interpreters that assisted Det. Norton were less than
stellar), whether she had "any independent knowledge of [defendant's] ability to use the
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English language . . . ? " (R. 360:266). See Aplt. Br. at 42-43. Defendant claims the
question unfairly undermined Hannan's opinion that defendant * 'appeared not to
understand English." Aplt. Br. at 43. However, Hannan expressed no such opinion.
Rather, the most that can be said is that on cross by the prosecutor, Hannan read
defendant's responses to the interviewers' indicating that defendant did think he
(defendant) understood English very well (R. 360:262). Defense counsel's redirect
established that defendant's responses were in Spanish {see R. 360:266). Therefore, the
trial court's question can hardly be said to have undermined an opinion Hannan herself
never rendered.
In any event, as noted in State v. Mellen, 583 P.2d 46,48 (Utah 1978), cited by
defendant, while the judge should "exercise restraint in examining witnesses," he
does have a function beyond sitting as a comparatively silent monitor of the
proceedings.... [I]t is within his prerogative to ask whatever questions of
witnesses as in his judgment is necessary or desirable to clarify, explain or
add to the evidence as it relates to the disputed issues.
Id. The court's single question to Hannan here falls well within the permitted ambit of
the above principle and in no manner undermined Hannan's credibility. Id.
Based on the above, defendant fails to demonstrate error, let alone obvious error,
in the trial court's management of the witness interrogations. His claim of plain error
therefore fails. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09.
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B.

The Jury Instructions Cured Any Arguable Error and/or
Prejudice

In any event, any arguable error in the trial court's interjections and comments
here was cured by the final jury instructions. Jury Instructions ##6 and 31 instructed the
jurors that they were not to be concerned with the reasons for any rulings the trial court
made during the course of the trial, and that
[t]he court has not intended to express, or intimate, or be understood as
giving any opinion on what the proof shows or does not show, or what are
or what are not the facts of the case. And it is immaterial what the court
thinks thereon. You must follow your own views and not be influenced by
the views of the court.
(R. 285, 311), add. C. Further, to the extent the trial court can be said to have
commented on defendant's right to testify, jury instruction #10 instructed that
defendant's failure to testify here was a not a circumstance that could be held against him
(R. 289), add. C. Defendant points to nothing in the record that would indicate the jury
was unable to follow these instructions. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 273 (Utah
1998).
Finally, none of the judicial conduct of which defendant's complains here,
whether considered individually or in the aggregate, rises to the level of that condemned
in People v. Vialpando, 809 P.2d 1082 (Colo. App. 1990), cert, denied, 825 P.2d 63
(Colo. 1992), upon which defendant relies. Aplt. Br. at 47. Vialpando complained of 53
incidents of judicial impropriety. Id. at 1084. On appeal, the Colorado court determined
that not all of Vialpando's complaints were legitimate, but that a significant number were
and reversed, in part, on that ground. Id. at 1083-1085.
35

Without going into specifics, the Vialpando court found that the trial judge there
"demonstrated an attitude of prejudice against the defense" by making "numerous
statements . . . evidencing his irritation and intolerance of defense questioning[,] . . .
call[ing] into question the defenses' trial tactics, as well as several unnecessary
comments and other disruptive remarks," and "seriously curtailed" Vialpando's "right to
object to testimony or argument." Id.
Additionally, the trial judge in Vialpando had complimented the prosecutor, but
"accused (defense) counsel of attempting to 'trap these people into an answer'" during
jury voir dire. Id. at 1084-1085. "In another instance, after the prosecution had made an
inaccurate and incomplete statement of the law, defense counsel objected but was told to
"sit down . . . you can correct that when you get up.'" Id. at 1085. The Vialpando trial
judge also instructed the defense counsel "that she must write out her objections" to the
prosecutor's closing argument, "to be acted upon at a later time." When Vialpando's
counsel asked if the same rule applied to the prosecutor, the trial judge "gave no answer,
but directed defense counsel to continue her argument." Id.
Based on these and other irregularities in the Vialpando trial judge's handling of
the case, including a failures to sequester the jury, to allow inquiry into the jury's
exposure to out-of-court information, and to give statutorily required introductory
instructions, the Vialpando court determined that Vialpando was entitled to a new trial.
Id. at 1083-1085.
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In sum, even assuming some unnecessary and/or curt remarks by the trial court
here, they were not so prejudicial as those in Vialpando, nor were they so devastating as
to vitiate the mitigating effect of instructions ##6, 10, and 31 (see R. 285, 289, 311),
add, C. See Harmon, 956 P.2d at 273. See Davis, 607 N.E.2d at 547 ("Assuming some
minimal prejudice from some of the trial court's comments and questions in the instant
case, we are persuaded that its corrective instruction admonishing the jury to disregard an
indication of its personal view of the evidence, sufficiently cured any error.").
Defendant's plain error claim should be rejected for failure to demonstrate any prejudice.
See Marvin, 964 P.2d at 317.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS WIDE
SENTENCING DISCRETION TO IMPOSE CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES FOR DEFENDANT'S AGGRAVATED BURGLARY
AND ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE CONVICTIONS
At the sentencing hearing in this case the trial court noted it had received and
reviewed the presentence investigation report (PSI) (R. 361:4) (a complete copy of the
sentencing transcript is contained in addendum D). The trial court also heard the
prosecutor's characterization of the offenses as "egregious," and defense counsel's
request that defendant be given credit for 236 days he had already served (R. 361:7),
add. D. Thereafter, the trial court imposed sentence:
Mr. Perez, having heard the evidence at the trial, I am persuaded that
the jury verdict was correct, that indeed, Mr. Perez, the conduct in which
you engaged was - - egregious; I guess is an appropriate term. Breaking
into a little lady's home in the middle of the night and stabbing her with a
knife, which of course is what the jury found you guilty of having done, in
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my estimation in this civilized society cannot and will not be tolerated, Mr.
Perez.
Therefore, it is the judgment and sentence of this court that you be
committed to the Utah State Prison forthwith to serve the term provided by
law for the first degree felony of five years to life, and for the second
degree felony of one to 15 years, and that those terms be served
consecutively and not concurrently.
As I am bound to do, I will grant you credit for the 236 days that
have spent in custody awaiting disposition in these matters.
(R. 361:8-9), add. D.
In Point IV of his brief, defendant contends that the trial court abused its wide
sentencing discretion by imposing the above consecutive terms. Aplt. Br. at 48.
Specifically, defendant complains that the trial court focused "exclusively"on the nature
and circumstances of his crimes, and did not consider his alleged "insignificant criminal
history, stable background, and desire to better himself." Id. Defendant's claim lacks
merit.
When a defendant is found guilty of more than one felony, Utah law affords the
trial court discretion to impose consecutive sentences. Indeed, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4401(1) (1999) provides that "[a] court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged
guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences for the offenses." Further, Section 76-3-401(4) sets forth the factors which a
trial court shall consider in deciding to impose consecutive terms. See also State v.
Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358-59 (Utah App. 1996). That section provides that the court
"shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character,
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and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive
sentences." Section 76-3-401(4). However, Section 76-3-401(4) requires only that the
court consider these factors, not that it give them equal weight. See State v. Nutall, 861
P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) ("the trial court did not abuse its discretion by placing
more emphasis on punishing defendant rather than rehabilitating him").
Here, as noted previously, before imposing consecutive terms, the trial court made
plain that it had reviewed the PSI report (R. 361:4), add. D. The PSI report covers
defendant's history, character, and rehabilitative needs, all of the criteria which defendant
claims the trial court should have, but did not, consider. See PSI at 5-10. Moreover, the
trial court was not bound by the recommendations from Adult Probation and Parole and
the prosecutor for the imposition of concurrent terms. Cf. State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d
1296, 1302 (Utah App. 1989) ("[T]here is not reason to set aside a guilty plea if the court
did not follow the prosecutor's recommendations, even if the defendant is disappointed
with the severity of the sentence"). Defendant's allegations of error are consequently
unfounded.9
Based on the above, the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences is well
within legally prescribed limits and should be affirmed. See Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at
652-653 ("because the length and consecutive nature of the terms are within the statutory
9

To the extent defendant suggests that the trial court inappropriately,
"automatically impose[s] consecutive sentences" in "many of his sentencing decisions,"
the suggestion is unfounded. See, e.g., State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, f7, 974 P.2d 279
(declining to consider evidence which is not part of the record on appeal). Moreover, as
demonstrated in the body of this point, any such suggestion is belied by the trial court's
proper exercise of its discretion in sentencing defendant.
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parameters, we cannot say that defendant's consecutive prison [] terms are either unfair
or unnecessarily harsh").
CONCLUSION
Defendant's jury convictions for aggravated burglary and for attempted murder
should be affirmed.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

.M.,,s.c.cP«flB|

TRANSCRIPTION DONE BY MARTHA E. HANNAN,

iiw
n r onnn * ^
Transcriber's note; The English grammar mistakes in the translated pAHfofl 3f^uu"
this transcript are an accurate refleSftbn of the poor Spanish grammar used by the
interpreter during the interview.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Abbreviations:
Underline = Phrase or word said in English while speaking in Spanish.
[U/l] = Unintelligible; [l/l] = Unintelligible in Spanish
UF = Unidentified female
STATE VS. JUAN a PEREZ. CASE # 991919507 FS
[INTERROGATION IN PROGRESS]
Detective:

He is trying toripsomething off. Was he doing drugs?

Interpreter

i,Por que entr6 a este casa? Usted va a este casa y despues,
^robaba en cosas en este casa?
Why did you go into this house? You go to this house and
then, would you steal things in this house?

Detective:

I just want to know why.

Interpreter

El quiere saber por que usted entrd ese casa por la ventana. Era
un... no era un... la mis vieja en este casa. Estaba... Where did
he cut her?
He wants to know why you went into this house. It was... it
wasn't., the oldest lady in this house. He/she was... Where did
he cut her?

Detective:

Ah... got her finger, her shoulder, and puncture...

Interpreter

Cortar esa chica en la deo, en la hombro y despues no pagar si es
persona vieja. Eso es un mal cosa...[l/l£ So, ^por que va a decir
cuando que piensa?
To cut that young lady in her finger, her shoulder, and then not
to pay if it is an old person. Thaf s a bad thing...[U/Q. So, why
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are you going to say when what you think?
Juan:

,Cuando? Pues^Por d7ogas?-Por...
len? Well, because ofdrugs? For...__,_

Interpreter

Por una cosa. Usted puede-.-^Probaban la cerveza por drogas?
cPor que?
For one thing. You can... Would you try beer for drugs? Why?

Juan:

Yo no... no... no... Cuando yo me metf, no habia... no habia nadie.
No habla gente. Ya... el cuarto ya no habia nadie. En el cuarto ya
no habia muebles ni ropa. Nada.
I didn't., didn't., didn't.. When I got in, there wasn't., there
wasn't anybody. There wasn't anybody. It already... There
wasn't anybody in the room anymore. There wasn't any
furniture or clothes. Nothing.

Interpreter

He said that there was nothing... nothing in the house when he was
there.

Detective:

[VOICES OVERLAP] Was... was this...? Why? Was it because she
pissed you off because she came out and told you guys to quit
drinking with the little girls and those type of things?

Interpreter

Porque ella...esta vieja... [VOICE OVERLAPS WITH
DETECTIVE'S]
Because she... this old lady... [VOICE OVERLAPS WITH
DETECTIVE'S]

Detective:

Told you to leave the place?

Interpreter

...antes... justed se habia enojado con ella porque eila le dip que
usted tenia que salir y no dar cerveza a la chica... a las chicas
menores?
...before... did you get upset with her because she told you
that you had to get out and not give beer to the young lady...
to minor young ladies?

Juan:

No. A mi nadie me dijo nada ahi.
No. Nobody told me anything in there.

Interpreter

Nuestro sabemos que usted tenia un disgusto con la chica vieja.
Ok? Porque muchas personas te veo. A lot of oeoole have seen
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him fighting around, arguing with the old ladv. Nuestro sabemos
que usted tien problem con la chica vieja. Ok. Ella le diso: eila no
queremos usted por la madrugada tomando cerveza... la cerveza
con la chica vieja... minores.
Our know that you would have an argument with the old young
lady. Ok? Because many people I see you. A lot of people have
seen himfightingaround, arguing with the old ladv. Our know
that you ha a problem with the old young lady. Ok. She telled
you: she we don't want you in the early morning drinking
beer... the beer with the old young lady... minors.
Juan:

Yo no nunca tomaba afuera. Yo tomaba en el apartamento arriba.
Yo vivfa arriba de...[l/l].
I would never drink outside. I would drink inside the apartment
above. I used to live above...[U/l].

Interpreter

He says he would drink in the apartment

Juan:

Los que tomaban afuera eran otros muchachos que iban andar ahi
a dar vuelta por ahi. Vendian droga y venden droga y estan todas
las noches, todos los dias.
The ones who would drink outside were other guys that would
go there to hang around in there. They would sell drugs and
they sell drugs. They are there every night every day.

Interpreter:

^Quien vende drogas?
Who sells drugs?

Juan:

Los muchachos que andan ahi.
The guys who hang around there.

Interpreter

tComo se llaman los muchachos?
What are the guys' names?

Juan:

No se c6mo se llaman. [VOCES SE ENTRELAZAN]..
I don't know their names. [VOICES OVERLAP]...

Interpreter:

He says [VOICES OVERLAP]...

Juan:

...Yo trabajo. Yo no vendo droga ni nada.
...I work. I don't sell drugs or anything.

Interpreter:

...the others sell drugs, not him.
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Interpreter:

Este muchacho que vende drogas iv'we con el?
This guy that sells drugs, do you live with him?

Juan:

No. Ellos llegan ahi al barrio.
No. They go there to the neighbor^

Interpreter
Interpreter

Juan:
Interpreter.

He says he leaves in the 'barrio'. He ., jes to the 'barrio'. I guess...
So. el no vive en el barrio. El va al barrio.

So, he doesn't live in the neighborhood. He goes to the
neighborhood.
Ellos van para alia.
They go over there.
Someone goes there. The name is not necessarily right, but...
[BACKGROUND: DOOR OPENS]

UF:

Hi!

Interpreter

You got my guy?

UF:

Yeah.

Detective:

Got it? Do you want to interrupt that?
[RECORDING IS STOPPED]
[RECORDING RESUMES]

Detective:

Ok. Juan, we know... we know you were in the apartment. You
admit to that. Ok. I just want to know why... ah... How she got cut.
Did she get cut with a knife or was it from her being thrown around
in the room? That is the biggest thing I want to know. With the
knife? or Did she get kicked... get cut by hitting the wall or hitting
into something or some piece of metal that was there?

Interpreter:

[I/I]

[U/o
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Juan:

No. Entre a una... con una mujer pero cuando entre yo al
apartamento ya no habia nadie. Cuando yo entre al
apartamento...[INTERPRETER INTERRUPTS]
No. I got a... I went in with a woman, but when I went into the
apartment, there wasn't anybody there anymore. When I went
into the apartment.. [INTERPRETER INTERRUPTS]

Interpreter

When he went...[U/l]...

Juan:

...ya no habia gente. Ya no habia muebles ni nada.

...there wasn't anybody anymore. There wasn't any furniture or
anything.
Interpreter

He says that nobody was there.

Detective:

Ok. Well, we know that somebody was there.

Interpreter

[Frase l/l]... en el apartamento.
[U/l phrase]... in the apartment

Detective:

I just want to know how she got her finger cut and her arm... and
her arm cut. Was it with a knife or was it her hitting something,
hitting her bed or...?

Interpreter

<j,listed tiene un [palabra l/l] or knife?
Do you have a [U/l word] or knife?

Detective:

Cuchillo.
Knife.

Interpreter

Yeah, cuchillo.
Yeah, ^cuchillo?

Juan:

Cuando entre al apartamento ni me fije. Nomas me meti asi sin
nada, pero ya no habia nada. No habia gente.
When I went into the apartment I did pay attention. I just went
in without anything, but there was nothing already. There
wasn't anybody.

Interpreter:

He is saying that nobody was there.

Detective:

The day that that happened, we went there. The police went there
and they talked to the people who had seen you come out of the

5

apartment that same day... that same night. So, there was people
living there. Don't give me the bull shit story that there was nobody
there.
Interpreter.

[Frase l/l]
[U/l phrase]

Juan:

Ahi no vive nadie. Cuando a mi me agarraron hoy, no vivia nadie.
No vive nadie ahi en ese apartamento. No hay gente.
Nobody lives there. When I was arrested today, there was
nobody living there. Nobody lives there in that apartment
There isn't anybody.

Interpreter:

He says nobody.

Interpreter

No me esta diciendo toda la verdad.
You are not telling me the whole truth.

Juan:

Si le estoy diciendo la verdad. Cuando yo me met! en el
apartamento, no habia gente. No Neve cuchillo ni nada porque yo
lleve a una muchacha... [INTERPRETEINTERRUPE]
I am telling you the truth. When I went into the apartment, there
was nobody. I didn't take a knife or anything with me because I
took a girl with me... [INTERPRETER INTERRUPTS]

Interpreter

He is saying that there was no knife, no people.

Juan:

...lleve a una muchacha para hacer el amor ahi con ella. Por eso
me meti al apartamento.
...I took a girl in with me to make love with her there. That's
why I went into the apartment

Interpreter.

i,Esa muchacha es tu novia?
Is that girl your girlfriend?

Juan:

No. No la conozco. La agarre en la calle.
No. I don't know her. I got her on the street

Interpreter

He says he doesn't know. He says he got her on the street.

Detective:

Your fingerprints are inside the window, Juan. Ah... when reached
in the window, you had to pull a stick out
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Interpreter:

La venta tiene su huella.
The sale has your fingerprint

Juan:

Disculpeme. Cuando lleve a la muchacha me met! por la ventana y
abri la puerta y ella se metio.
Excuse me. When I took the girl, I went in through the window
and I opened the door and she went in.

Interpreter

i listed entrd inlegal?

*the word inlegal does not exist in
Spanish. The correct word is ilegai.

Did you go in illegally?
Juan:

No.
No.

Interpreter:

He said they went in the apartment with permission and that...

Detective:

Permissionfromwho?

Interpreter

cDe quien? ^Permiso de quien?
Whose? Whose permission?

Juan:

De nadie. Yo me meti asi nomas porque no habia gente y estaba
abierta la ventana.
Nobody's. I just went in because there wasn't anybody there
and the window was open.

Interpeter

i,C6mo entr6 un apartamento? Ese no es su apartamento,
^correcto? Es de otro persona. <,C6mo entro?
How did you go an apartment? That is not your apartment,
right? If s another person's. How did you go in?

Juan:

No. No habia gente. No habia gente, pero me meti porque la
ventana estaba abierta.
No. There wasn't anybody. There wasn't anybody, but I went in
because the window was open.

Interpreter

He is saying that there wasn't anybody there. He is saying...

Interpreter

Yo no entiendo sefior.
I don't understand sir.
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Juan:

La ventana estaba abierta.
The window was open.

Interpreter:

He is saying that the window was open.

Interpreter

Pero usted no tiene permiso para entrar al apartamento,
^correcto?
But you don't have permission to go into the apartment,
correct?

Juan:

No. No tenia permiso de nadie.
No. I didn't have anybody's permission.

Interpreter

Ok. So, he is admitting that., ok...

Interpreter

Usted tiene [frase l/l] entrar al apartmento.
You have [U/l phrase] to go into the apartment

Interpreter

So, he understood that it is against the law to enter the apartment

Detective:

Which... which window did he enter? Was it the bedroom window?
Where the kitchen is? or where the living room is at?
Ah... <,Que venta entr6 usted?
Ah... What sale did you go in?
Por la... por la cocina.

Interpreter
Juan:

Through... through the kitchen.
Interpreter

The kitchen window.

Detective:
Interpreter

How did he leave?
^Y c6mo salir el apartamento?
And how to leave the apartment?

Juan:

Me saii por la puerta con la muchacha despues.
I later left through the door with the girl.

Interpreter

Through the door.

Interpreter:

^Que muchacha?
What girl?
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Es una guera. No !a conozco. La agarre en la calle. No se quien
es.
It's a blonde girl. I don't know her. I got her on the street I
don't know who she is.
Interpreter:

He says that he doesn't know the person [Rest of phrase is U/l]. It's
just a lady.

Detective:

Does the door have a... a lock that you have to have a key with
inside?

Interpreter.

^Usted necesita un Have por la puerta?
Do you need a key for the door?

Juan:

No. Por dentro le quite el seguro y cuando ya sali le puse otra vez
el seguro y ya sali por la puerta.
No. I unlocked from the inside. When I then went out, I locked
it and left through the door.

Interpreter

What? Yo no entiendo. ^Usted no necesita la Have?
What? I don't understand. Don't you need a key?

Juan:

No. Me met! por la ventana cuando me meti pa' dentro. Y ya
despues cuando me sali pa' fuera abri la puerta. [PAUSA] Cuando
me vine para afuera... cuando me sali...
No. I went in through the window when I went in. And when I
later left, I opened the door. [PAUSE] When I went outside...
when I left..

Interpreter

Uh-huh.

Juan:

...abri la puerta.

...I opened the door.
Interpreter

He says that he opened the door.

Juan:

Le quite el seguro.
I unlocked i t

Interpreter

^La Have en el lock?
The key in the lock?

Juan:

No. No tenia Have. Nomas asi. Le quite el seguro. No tenia seguro.
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No. It didn't have a key. Just without it I unlocked i t It didn't
have a lock.
interpreter

He says he didn't have to use a key. He just opened the door and
left.

Detective:

What time did he... what time did he enter the... the... the
apartment? What time of the day or night?

Interpreter

<,Que hora entr6 al apartamento?
What time did you go into the apartment?

Juan:

Pues, serian como a las tres o las dos de la tarde.
Well, it must have been at around three or two in the
afternoon.

Interpreter

Ok. Three P.M.

Interpreter

[U/l Phrase in Spanish]

Juan:

Mas o menos. No estoy seguro.
More or less. I'm not sure.

Interpreter

Ok. He is not sure it was at three.

Detective:

Three in the morning.

Interpreter

iQe la tarde o de la mafiana?
In the afternoon or in the morning?
De la ma... de la tarde.

Juan:

In the mor... in the afternoon.
Interpreter

Ok.

Detective:

Well, he is obviously changing the story going back and forth.
Ah...
He did admit that he entered the apartment

Interpreter
Detective:

Yeah, he admitted that he... that he went in. That's how his
fingerprints got in there. But obviously, they didn't know that he
was in there, and we know no different They have... ah... they
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have a dead bolt or a key that you have to use on the inside to
leave. So, he had to leave off the window. So... there is no way he
could have left out the door.
Interpreter

Listed no puede salir por la puerta, senor. Usted salir apartamento,
usted necesita sale por la venta. ^Correcto?
You can't go out the door, sir. You to leave apartment, you
need leave through sale. Right?

Juan:

No. Entre por la ventana y sali por la puerta.
No. I went in through the window and I left through the door.

Interpreter

He is saying: He entered through the window and he left through
the door.

Detective:

Did the girl leave with you at the same time?

Interpreter

i,Esta muchacha estaba ahi con usted?
Was this girl there with you?

Juan:

Si. Ella sali6 primero y despues sail yo.
Yes. She went out first and then I did.

Interpreter

iElla?
She?

Juan:

Ella salid mas primero y despues sali yo.
She went out first and then I did.

Interpreter

Ok. ^Con usted?
Ok. With you?

Juan:

Si.
Yes.

Interpreter

Ok. He is saying that the girl went to the door first and then he
followed.

Detective:

Why is it that when the police came right after that happened...?

Interpreter

Cuando la policia estaba en el apartamento...
When the police was in the apartment..
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Detective:

...the people were there that... with us, you coming... going into the
apartment and coming out of the apartment when they were there,
why are they saying this about you?

Interpreter.

The gente cerca del apartamento dice usted ir al apartamento a or
[PAUSA] I oet bad with stuff like this.
The people near the apartment say you to go to the apartment
to or [PAUSE] \ get bad with stuff like this.

Detective:

I can understand.

Interpreter

Ah... La gente dice usted enter el apartamento y usted sale del
apartamento.
Ah... The people say you enter the apartment and you go out

the apartment
Juan:

SI entre pero me sali tambien por la puerta. Entre por la ventana y
me sali por la puerta.

Yes, I went in, but I also left through the door. I went in through
the window and I left through the door.
Interpreter

Ok. He is saying...

Juan:

SI me vieron porque era de dfa. Yo pienso que si me vid la gente
porque era de dia.
I was seen because it was daylight I think that people saw me
because it was daylight

Interpreter

iLa gente dice la verdad?
Do the people say the truth?

Juan:

No se. Ella dice la verdad porque me vid que entre yo pero eso de
dia. A lo mejor me vieron que me meti.
I don't know. She is saying the truth because she saw me go
in, but that was during the day. Maybe I was seen when I went

in.
Interpreter

Ok. He is saying that he did go in. That he was seen going in.

Detective:

So, the people would see that he went in?

Interpreter

Uh-huh.
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And leave? [PAUSE] Does he... [PAUSE] I... Is he here legally?
Interpreter:

[U/l PHRASE] [VOICES FROM DETECTIVE AND INTERPRETER
OVERLAP]
^Tienes los documentos propios para los Estados Unidos, sefior?
Ok iUsted entro inlegai*? Ok ^Por cuanto tiempo vive usted en los
Estados Unidos?
Do you have your own documents for the United States, sir?
Ok. Did you come illegally? Ok, How long do you live in the
United States for?

Juan:

Como cuatro aflos.
About four years.

Interpreter:

Ok. ^Tiene documentos? Ok. Ah... <,Ha sido arrestado en los
Estados Unidos antes?
Ok. Do you have documents? Ok. Have you been arrested in
the United States before?

Juan:

Sf.
Yes.

Interpreter

1?QT que?
Why?

Juan:

Por estar tomando.
For drinking.

Interpreter

Ok. Ha sido arrestado de la Migra antes?
Ok. Have you been arrested of the immigration before?

Juan:

No.
No.

Interpreter

i,Tenia problemas con los polocias en su pais?

Did you have problems with the police in your country?
Juan:

No.
No.

Interpreter

i,Nunca has tenido...?
Have you ever...?
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No.
No.
Interpreter:

Ok. Ah... I just wanted to know what... He entered four years ago.
Ah... He's been arrested one time for drinking. That's it. [U/l
Phrase].

Detective:

Alright. Just tell him... Ask him what he is more scared of: You guys
from immigration or to have to deal with the local police. Being
deported back or having to deal with the charge.

Interpreter

Usted tiene dos opci6n: dar a la corte del estado por este cargo o
regresar para Mexico. ^Que quiere usted?
You have two option: to give the State court for this charge or
to go back to Mexico. What do you want?

Juan:

Regresar a Mexico.
To go back to Mexico.

Interpreter

Ok. He... He'd much rather be deported.

Juan:

<,Que? ^Cdrno? No le entendf. ^Como me dijo?
What? How? I didn't understand you. What did you tell me?

Interpreter.

Ok. Usted tiene dos opcion: Regresar para Mexico o... porque
usted no tiene documentos, <i,correcto? o estar en la carcel por el
[Frase l/l] por estos cargos.
Ok. You have two option: To go back to Mexico or... because
you don't have documents, right? Or Stay in jail for the [U/l
PHRASE] for these charges.

Juan:

En Mexico, no tengo nada. <,Que voy a hacer en Mexico? Alia esta
mi familia y yo le mandaba dinero. Por eso vine aca.
I don't have anything in Mexico. What am I going to do in
Mexico? I have my family there and I was sending them money.
That's why I came here.

Interpreter

i,Este enojado dice la verdad? ^Usted no tiene problemas con ese
lugar?
Does this upset one say the truth? Don't you have problems
with that place?
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Juan:

No. Yo no tengo problema con nadie alia donde vivo. No se por
que me estan acusando de eso.
No. I don't have problems with anyone where i live. I don't
know why I am being accused of that

Interpreter

Ok. i,La gente en la calle no dice la verdad?
Ok. Don't people on the street say the truth?

Juan:

Si. Yo me meti a ese apartamento pero fue de dia cuando me meti,
y me meti con una muchacha. No se si vieron a la muchacha
tambien; a la seftora. 0 nada mas me vieron a mi. No se.
Yes. I went into that apartment, but it was during the day when
I went in. And I went in with a girl. I don't know if the girl was
also seen, the woman. Or maybe I was the only one seen, i
don't know.

Interpreter.

That night, he says, he didn't do anything.

Detective:

All I want to know, Juan, is that we know you did it. Ok? We... we
want to make sure that there isn't anybody else that was involved
that is out there that is doing these same things. That there is
another person that is going to be burglarized and hurting people.
Is there anybody else that was involved with it... with you? Are you
the only one that did it that went into the apartment? Or Is there
anyone else?

Interpreter

iEntrd al apartamento con otro persona?
Did you go into the apartment with another person?

Juan:

No. Nomas con la muchacha.
No. Just with the girl.

Interpreter

[Frase l/l] serlor.
[U/l Phrase] sir.

Juan:

i,C6mo?
What?

Interpreter:

^listed entro al apartamento con otro gente?
Did you go into the apartment with another people?

Juan:

No. Con la muchacha entre.
No. I went in with the girl.
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£Y nada mas?
And that's all?
Juan:

Ai3

Uh-huh.
Interpreter

Ok. Porque el no quiere mas problemas con la mujer y la otra
gente en esa...
Ok. Because he doesn't want to have more problems with the
woman and the other people in that..

Juan:

Yo tampoco quiero que la muchacha tenga problema porque ella...
Yo le pague 20 pesos a ella. Veinte (20) dolares le pague.
I don't want the girl to have problems either because she... I
paid her 20 'pesos'. I paid her 20 dollars.

Interpreter

^Porque?
Why?

Juan:

Porque... para que hiciera el amor conmigo.
Because... so she would make love to me.

Interpreter.

Yo no entiendo. Usted pag6 20 dollars por...
I don't understand. You paid 20 dollars for...

Juan:

Por hacer el amor con la muchacha y ella me cobrd 20 dolares por
hacer el amor. Yo se los di y la lleve para alia para el apartamento.
To make love with the girl; and she charged me 20 dollars to
make love. I gave them to her and I took there to the
apartment

Interpreter

lie pagd 20 dollars por eso nomas?
Did you pay her 20 dollars for that only?

Juan:

Aja.
Uh-huh.

Interpreter

Now, he is saying that he paid 20 dollars for this girl.

Detective:

Pardon me.

Interpreter

Now, he is saying...
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Interpreter

i,Es su novia o...?
Is she your girlfriend or...?

Juan:

No. No es mi novia. No la conozco. Yo la mire en la calle. Estaba
sentada en la calle ella y yo le dije que si queria hacer un party.
Ella me dijo que si.
No. She is not my girlfriend. I don't know her. I saw on the
street She was sitting on the street and I asked her if she
wanted to have a party. She told me yes.

Interpreter

[LAUGHS] Now, he is saying that now the girl would talk to.

Juan:

Y ella me dijo que si. Yo me la lleve para alia... para... para alia...
para ei carro. Yo le dije que nos podiamos quedar en mi carro. Y
ella me dijo que no que ahi estaba el apartamento que no habia
gente y que la ventana estaba abierta. Yo me meti a abrirla.
So, she said yes. I took her to... to... over there... to the car. I
told her that we could stay in my car. She said no. She said
that there was an apartment there; that there wasn't anybody
there and the window was open. I got in to open the window.

Interpreter

That doesn't seem to be what he was saying [U/l Phrase] ago.

Juan:

Esa es la verdad.
That's the truth.

Detective:

No. It wasn't. We have [U/l Phrase] other than what he said about
her going in there with him. He had told about leaving with her. But,
being a prostitute was never brought up. [IN A LOUDER VOICE
DETECTIVE SAYS:] Who cares about the prostitute? That's not
what I'm asking, Juan. I think you understand a little bit more
because our officers just arrested you the other night. I think you
understand me when I'm speaking English to you. All right?
[DETECTIVE AND INTERPRETER LAUGH]

Detective:

You can tell right there.

Interpreter

We picked him up for a D.I.U, and that's why he got picked up.

Detective:

I think Juan knows he can speak English OK. [U/l Phrase]

Interpreter

So, you're saying that you wouldn't...
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Wasn't it because she pissed you off... she pissed you guys off that
you went in there? Did you go in there to steal something? Or Did
you go in there to hurt her? Because if you went in there to steal
something, I can nre less.
Juan:

No entiendo mu. j . Poquito.
I don't understand a lot A little.

Interpreter:

i?or que entrd un apartamento, sefior?
Why did you go in apartment, sir?

Juan:

Oh, porque ella queria coger en el carro y ese es un delito estar en
la calle.
Oh, because she wanted to fuck on the street; and that is a
crime.

Interpreter

iElla?
She?

Juan:

SI, ella queria en mi carro. Pero si me veia la policia, me iba a
arrestar por estar haciendo cosas ilegales en la calle. Por eso,
mejor me met! al apartamento.
Yes. She wanted it in my car. But if the police would see me,
they were going to arrest me for doing illegal things on the
street That is why it was better for me to go into the
apartment

Interpreter

Esta mujer quien vive en el apartamento...
That woman who lives in the apartmentNo. Es la otra que estaba en la calle. No la que vivia en el
apartamento. No la sertora que vivia ahi. No la conozco. Yo
apenas llegue por ahi ai apartamento.
No. it was the other that was on the street It's not the one that
lived in the apartment It's not the lady that used to live there. I
don't know her. I just went to the apartment

Juan:

Interpreter

El vi6 que usted tiene un problema con esta mujer en el
apartamento.
He saw that you have a problem with this woman in the
apartment

Juan:

No. Yo no tengo problema con ninguna mujer ahi.
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No. I don't have a problem with any woman there.
Interpreter:

He is saying that he didn't have a problem with the lady.

Detective:

Does he know who she is? Has he seen her before?

Interpreter

^listed conozco la mujer que vive el apartamento?
Do you I know the woman that lives the apartment?

Juan:

No.
No.

Interpreter.

[Frase l/l]
[U/l Phrase]

Juan:

No. No se ni como se llama. Si la mire una sefiora que vive ahi con
otro muchacho- Una sefiora grande y un muchacho grerludo. No
la conozco yo.
No. I don't even know what her name is. I saw a woman that
used to live there with a young guy-an older lady and a
tangled-hair guy.
[U/l INTERPRETER'S AND DETECTIVE'S VOICE OVERLAP]

Juan:

No la conozco yo.
I don't know her.

Interpreter

He is saying that he has seen her but he doesn't know her. He
doesn't know her name.

Detective:

So, he knows who she is or where she lives. She's lived for over
six months. She hasn't moved out. So the apartment hasn't been
vacant. Ok? We know that Do you understand?

Juan:

Poquito.
A little.

Detective.

Ok. The apartment wasn't vacant They were living there. That's a
bull shit story is what you are telling that it was empty. We know
that. Ok? We know you were inside because your finger prints
were inside. Is there anything that you took? That's all I want to
know. Is there anything that you took? Did you take anything out of
the house? Any money?
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Interpreter

<Jienes la propiedad de esta mujer?
Do you have the property of this woman?

Juan:

No.
No.
Cuando usted sale de su apartamento, <,trae otro [PALABRA l/l]?
When you go out of your/her apartment, did you have [U/l
word?

Interpreter

Juan:

No. Me sail asi con la muchacha. Nothing. No agarre nada. No
habia nada.
No. I left with the girl. Nada. i didn't grab anything. There
wasn't anything.

Interpreter

i,No dinero o...?
No money or...?

Juan:

No. No habia nada. No habia muebles, nada. No habia nada. No
habia ropa, nada.
No. There wasn't anything. There was no furniture. Nothing.
There wasn't anything. There wasn't any clothes. Nothing.

Interpreter

He says that he didn't touch anything.

Interpreter

No TV? No...?

Juan:

Nada. No habia nada.
Nothing. There wasn't anything.

Interpreter

No jewelry?

Juan:

Nada. Nada.
Nothing. Nothing.

Detective:

Did you through any of the stuff... any of the... ah... closets or
anything like while you were there looking for something?

Interpreter

i,Busc6 por el apartamento? ^Por cosas?
Did you look around the apartment? Fdr thins?

Juan:

No. No. Yo meti nada mas para hacer el amor con la muchacha.
No. No. I only went in there to make love with the girt.
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Interpreter

No?

Juan:

No. No habia ropa. No habia nada.
No. There wasn't any clothes. There wasn't anything.

Interpreter

^Pero el apartamento tiene mesas y... ah... y propiedad?
But the apartment has tables and ... ah... and property?

Juan:

No. No tenia nada cuando yo me meti. No habia gente. No vivia
nadie.
No. It didn't have anything when I got in there. There weren't
people. Nobody lived there.

Interpreter

He says that there was nothing there. I asked him if there was a
table or anything. He said nothing.

Detective:

Well, I think that... I mean he was going there to try to have sex.
There was some money that was taking. Did you take it?

Juan:

Yo nunca...
I never...

Interpreter

^listed saca el dinero?
Do you take the money?

Juan:

No.
No.

Interpreter

^Seguro?

Juan:

Seguro que no agarre el dinero.
I assure you I didn't take the money.
No. La verdad, sefior.
No. The truth, sir.

Interpreter
Juan':

La verdad.

The truth.
Interpreter

^Cuanto dinero tiene usted?
How much money do you have?

Juan:

Ahorita mi... ^En donde?
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Right now my... Where?
Interpreter

Cuando usted sale del apartamento. ^Cuanto dinero tenia usted?
Cuando usted...
When you go out the apartment How much money did you
have? When you...

Detective:

There was somebody in her... in her bedroom. Did you take the
money that was out of her bedroom? I... I don't care about what
happened to her. Ok? I want to find out about the money. Did you
take any money that was in her apartment when you were there?

Interpreter

i,Que pas6 con el dinero?
What happened with the money?

Juan:

^Que dinero? Yo... yo... yo trabajo. El dinero que yo gano yo...
What money? I... I... I work. The money that I make, I...

Interpreter

[U/ll

Detective:

That*s what she said. She said that she had money in her apart...
in her bedroom when this person... when you... when you came in.
She says that there was money in there. Is she lying? Or Is she
telling the truth? Was there money or not?

Interpreter

Cuando usted entr6 a su apartamento, la mujer dice usted tiene
ah... elia tiene dinero. ^Usted saca este dinero? Or ^Esa mujer no
dice la verdad?
When you went into her apartment, the woman says you have
ah... she has money. Do you take this money? Or Is she not
telling the truth?

Juan:

Yo no... Cuando yo entre al apartamento, no habia gente.
I don't.. When iwent into the apartment, there wasn't anybody.

Interpreter
Juan:

Interpreter

He saying: No one was there.
Cuando yo me meti no habia nada. No habia...
When I went in there was nothing in there. There wasn't...
<,Y no bolsas, no... no... no dinero... no nada?
No bags? No... No... No money... No nothing?
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Nada. No habia gente. No habia gente. Yo me met! nomas con la
muchacha. Yo! Yo nomas solito con la muchacha.
Nothing. There wasn't anybody. There wasn't anybody. I only
went in with the girt. II I, by myself, went in with the girt.
Interpreter:

He says he just went with the lady. No one else was there.

Juan:

No habia gente. No habia gente en esa casa... en ese
apartamento ese donde dice.
There wasn't anybody. There wasn't anybody in that house...
in that apartment you're saying.

Interpreter

Sefior, la version que dice usted entro a este apartamento y... una
mujer tenia apartamento. Y esta mujer tiene problemas con usted.
Yo no entiendo.
Sir, your story is that you went into that apartment and... a
woman had apartment And this woman has problems with
you. I don't understand.

Juan:

Yo la mujer que Jleve, !a agarre en \a calle. No... no... no... En \a
calle iba yo en mi carro y la mire. Ella estaba sentada y yo le
habie. Le dije si queria hacer party. Ella me dijo que si.
The woman that I took, I got on the street No... no... no... I was
in my car on the street and i saw her. She was seating and I
spoke to her. I asked her if she wanted to party. She said yes.

Interpreter

[U/l]

Juan:

Esa es la verdad. Es la verdad lo que le estoy diciendo. No estoy
diciendo mentiras.
That*s the truth. What I'm saying is the truth. I'm not saying
lies.

Detective:

What do you think is going to happen to you, Juan, when you go to
trial? When you get prosecuted for this?

Interpreter

I don't see the need to ask him that. I don't think he is going to
come clean with anything.

Detective:

What if you do go to trial? And you go to prison. If you tell them the
truth, do you know what is going to happen to you? Salt Lake City,
Utah. You tell them the truth and the judge... well, I don't want to
make any promises... but, you probably be deported pretty quick. If
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you tell the truth [U/l word]. Ok. If you tell the truth of what
happened, more likely all is going to happen is maybe you just be
deported. Maybe.
Interpreter:

No guarantees.

Detective:

No guarantees, but if you seat there and lie to everything and don't
come clean with us, then what do you think they are going to do?
They got your finger prints on the inside of that apartment. They
know you were there.

Juan:

Yo no robe nada. No robe nada yo.
I didn't steal anything. I didn't steal anything.

Interpreter

He says he didn't rob anybody.

Detective:

Was there any other people inside the apartment when you went in
other than the lady?

Interpreter.

^Tiene...? Cuando usted entrd departamento, justed entr6 con
otra persona o usted y esa mujer solamente?
Do you have...? When you went into apartment, did you go in
with another person or you and that woman only?

Juan:

Nomas yo y la muchacha. La seriora.
Only the girt and myself. The lady.

Interpreter

Ok. And the girl.

Interpreter

i,E! apartamento tiene otra persona?
Does the apartment have another person?

Juan:

No. No habia.
No. There wasn't

Interpreter

No. ^No persona?
No. No person?

Juan:

No. Dos personas. Yo y la muchacha.
No. Two people. The girt and myself.

Interpreter:

Ok.
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Detective:

Do you know the old lady's son? Have you seen him before?

Interpreter

Ha visto la novia... Oh, perdon... la nifio de tu mujer?
Have you seen the girlfriend... Ohl sorry... the boy of your
woman?

Juan:

No. No se si tiene niiios.
No. I don't know if she has small children.

Interpreter

[U/l]

Detective:

No. He is not a kid anymore. He is forty years old.

Interpreter

Oh.

Detective:

It's your last chance, Juan. I'm going to walk out of the door. I'm
going to go tell the... You know... finish my paperwork and basically
say that... that you lied about everything and wouldn't come clean
with anything and you are not going to stand up to your mess.

Interpreter

La ultima persona dice la verdad, seftor.
The last person tells the truth, sir.

Juan:

Ya le dije la verdad. Nomas lleve a la muchacha. Nomas yo. Yo y
la muchacha y no habia nada. No habia muebles. Nada. Esa es la
verdad.
I already told the truth. I only took the girl. Myself only. The girl
and myself, and there wasn't anything. There wasn't furniture.
Nothing. That's the truth.

Detective:

You know... If you... If you come clean with us, maybe you can
work something with the District Attorney and a plea for the charge.

Interpreter

Si usted dice la verdad, usted... depende lo... usted no va a [Frase
l/l]...nuevamente en Mexico... no violar nunca la ley o la plicia.
Claro que si usted no dice la verdad...
If you teli the truth, you... it depends on... you are not going
to... [U/l Phrase]... in Mexico again... never violate the law or
'plicia*. [INTERPRETER INTERPRETED THE ENGLISH WORD
"PLEA'' AS 'PLICIA'. 'PLICIA' DOES NOT EXIST IN SPANISH]

Juan:

Estoy diciendo la verdad. [EMPHATIC STATEMENT]
I'm telling the truth.
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Interpreter

I'm telling the truth.

Juan:

Esa es la verdad. Ya mi se quiere deportar, pues me deporta. No
hay problema.
That's the truth. If you want to deport me, then deport me. No
problem.

Detective:

What did he say?

Interpreter

That that's the truth.

Detective:

Ok. [RECORDING WAS STOPPED AND STARTED AGAIN]

Juan:

[Frase l/l]... se salio ella y yo tambien me sali. Esa es la verdad. Yo
acepto que me metf, pero yo no agarre nada. Ya estaba limpio ei
apartamento. Ya no habia muebles. No habia nada. No habia
cama. Nada. Esa es la verdad.
[U/l Phrase]... she went out and I also went out That's the
truth. I accept responsibility for going in, but I didn't take
anything. The apartment was already clean. There wasn't any
furniture anymore. There wasn't anything. There wasn't a bed.
Nothing! That*s the truth.

Detective:

Ok.
[END OF RECORDING]
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Addendum B

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
JOHN N. SPIKES, 3062
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Screened by: J. Spikes
Assigned to: TBAM
DAO# 99018922
BAIL: $250,000
Warrant/Release: Non-Jail

-vsJUAN QUITERIO PEREZ
DOB 03/08/74,
AKANONE
20 West Plumtree
Unknown
OTN
SO# 0228287

INFORMATION
Case No.

9919I4QT7 FS

Defendant.
The undersigned Detective Norton - Midvale City Police Department, Agency Case No.
99-5114, under oath states on information and belief that the defendant committed the crimes of:
COUNT I
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a First Degree Felony, at 533 West Tiffany Town Drive, in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about August 9, 1999, in violation of Title 76, Chapter
6, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JUAN
QUITERIO PEREZ, a party to the offense, entered or remained unlawfully in the
dwelling of Ellen Kuhel with the intent to commit an assault, and caused bodily injury to
Ellen KuheL

n
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INFORMATION
STATE OF UTAH v. JUAN QUITERIO PEREZ
DAO No. 99018922
Page 2
COUNT II
ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER, a Second Degree Felony, at 533 West
Tiffany Town Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about August 9, 1999, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in
that the defendant, JUAN QUITERIO PEREZ, a party to the offense, attempted to
intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Ellen Kuhel.
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Ellen Kuhel, Robert Kuhel, Detective Wathan, Detective Burgon, Officer Holdaway,
Detective Norton, Karen Suprunowicz, Officer Yurgelon, Officer Proulx, and Dean
Warnke.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant bases this Information upon the following:
1.
The statement of Ellen Kuhel, to Midvale Police Officer B. Holdaway, that on
August 9, 1999, she was at her home, located at 533 West Tiffany Town Drive, Salt Lake
County, Utah. At approximately 12:30 a.m., Ms. Kuhel was awakened by a male who was in her
bedroom "punching" her. Ms. Kuhel struggled with the male, and then kicked him in the groin.
At that time the male left Ms. Kuhel's home. Ms. Kuhel awakened her son, and then telephoned
the police.
2.
The statement of Officer Holdaway that he observed blood coming from Ms.
Kuhel's head and a gash under her eye. Officer Holdaway also noted that there was blood on
Ms. Kuhel's nightgown, the light switch, the wall in the hallway, and Ms. Kuhel's bed . Ms.
Kuhel was transported to the hospital for her injuries.
3.
The written statement of Dr. Karen Suprunowicz that she works in the emergency
room at Cottonwood Hospital, located at 5770 South 300 East. Dr. Suprunowicz treated Ms.
Kuhel for her injuries, and determined that Ms. Kuhel had been stabbed. Ms. Kuhel required
sutures for her scalp and face, and Dr. Suprunowicz noted that there were abrasions on Ms.
Kuhel's shoulder, breast, right arm, palm, and thumb, as well as her left hand.
4.
The statement of Detective G. Wathen that he checked Ms. Kuhel's kitchen
window, and located fingerprints on theframeand the tile below it.
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5.
The statement of Detective L. Burgon that he compared the above fingerprints
with fingerprints previously provided by the defendant, Juan Quiterio Perez, and determined that
they matched.

~UOi

DETECTIVE NORTON
Affiant
Subscribed and
day

to before me this

Authorized for presentment and filing:
DAVID E. YOC0M Didtact Attorney

•• r-rfi

Deputy District Attorney
September 30,1999
ddo/99018922

r ro04

Addendum C

INSTRUCTION NO.

b

At times throughout the trial the court has been called
upon to determine whether certain offered evidence might properly be admitted.

You are not to be concerned with the reasons

for such rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them.
Whether offered evidence is admissible is purely a question
of law.

In admitting evidence to which an objection is made,

the court does not determine what weight should be given such
evidence; nor does it pass on the credibility of the witness.
You are not to consider evidence offered but not admitted, nor
any evidence stricken out by the court; as to any question to
which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to
what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the
objection.

00285

INSTRUCTION NO.

\0

You are instructed that the defendant is a competent
witness in his own behalf and has the right to go upon the
witness stand and testify if he chooses to do so.

However,

the law expressly provides that no presumption adverse to him
is to arise from the mere fact that he does not place himself
upon the witness stand.

If he is satisfied with the evidence

which has been given, there is no occasion for him to add
thereto.
So, in this case the mere fact that this defendant has
not availed himself of the privilege which the law gives him
should not prejudice him in any way.

It should not be considered

as any indication either of his guilt or of his innocence.

The

failure of the defendant to testify is not even a circumstance
against him and no presumption of guilt can be indulged in the
minds of the jury by reason of such failure on his part.

00289

Under

the

law

INSTRUCTION NO.

^<

of

Utah,

the

State

of

Attempted

Criminal

Homicide constitutes Attempted Murder if the actor:
(a)

attempted

to

intentionally

or

knowingly

cause

the

death of another;
or,
(b)

intending

to cause

serious bodily

injury

to

another

commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that attemptes to
cause the death of another;
or,
(c)

acting

under

circumstances

evidencing • a

depraved

indifference to human life engages in conduct which creates a
grave risk of death to another and thereby attempts to cause the
death of another.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Before
of

the

you

offense

can
of

convict

the

Attempted

^U>
defendant,

Criminal

JUAN

Homocide,

Q.

PEREZ,

Murder,

as

charged in count II of the information, you must find from all
of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one
of the following elements of that offense:
1.
Lake

That on or about the 9th day of August, 1999, in Salt

County,

State

of

Utah,

the

defendant,

JUAN

Q.PEREZ,

attempted to cause the death of ELLEN KUHEL; and
2.

That

said

defendant

then

intentionally or knowingly; or

and

there

did

so:

(a)

(b) intending to cause serious

bodily injury to another, he committed an act clearly dangerous
to human life, which act attempted to cause the death of ELLEN
KUHEL; or (c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved
indifference

to human life, he knowingly

engaged

in conduct

which created a grave risk of death to another and which conduct
attempted to cause the death of ELLEN KUHEL; and
3.

That said defendant then and there did so unlawfully.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must

find

the

defendant

guilty

of

Attempted

Criminal

Homocide,Murder as charged in count II of the information.

If,

on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt of any one or more of the foregoing eLements, then you
must find the defendant not guilty of count II.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

Unt

As used in these instructions, "grave risk of death" refers
to

probability

of

the

risk

of

death

"substantial and unjustifiable" risk.

greater

than

just

a

A "grave risk of death"

means a highly likely probability that death will result from
the risk that the defendant knowingly creates.
The term "knowingly" as used in the definition of depraved
indifference murder means that the actor knew the nature of his
conduct, knew the circumstances that gave rise to the risk of
death, and knew that the risk constituted a grave risk of death,
but he need not have had as his conscious objective or desire to
cause the result; nor, need he be aware that his conduct is
reasonably certain to cause the results i.e., death.
The term "depraved indifference to human life" refers not
to the subjective culpable mental state of depraved indifference
murder, but rather to an objective reasonable person standard as
to the value of human life.

"Depraved indifference" means an

utter callousness toward the value of human life and a complete
and total indifference as to whether one's conduct will create a
grave risk of death to another.

Thus, a finding of depraved

indifference must be based on an objective evaluation of the
magnitude of the risk created
surrounding the death.

and of all

circumstances

That evaluation should focus on the

gravity of the risk to human life that
callousness of attitude

the

toward that

is created and the

risk. In evaluating the

evidence, the jury should consider the following factors:

(1)

the utility of the defendant's conduct which attempted to cause

00306

the

death;

(2)

the

magnitude

of

the

risk

created

by

tne

defendant's conduct; (3) the defendant's knowledge of the risk;
and (4) any precaution taken by the defendant to minimize that
risk.

00307

INSTRUCTION NO.

2^ , <Q

I have previously used the term, "depraved indifference"
these instructions.
statute.

m

The term is not specifically defined by

Thus, the phrase, "depraved indifference" is a concept

which must be left largely to the experience and common sense of
the jury.
To engage in conducts with a "depraved indifference to human
life, " a person must do more than act "recklessly, " but he need
not have as his conscious objective or desire

to cause the

result/ nor need he be aware that his conduct is reasonably
certain to cause the result.
Rather, the greatness of the risk which the defendant's
actions create and the lack of justification for the creation of
the risk is the test to be applied in determining whether the
defendant's conduct evidences a "depraved indifference to human
life.»
The circumstances under which the defendant acted must be
viewed objectively by a reasonable man rather than subjectively
by

the

actual

state

of

the

defendant's

mind

in

order

to

determine whether the circumstances under which the defendant
acted were such as to evidence a depraved indifference to human
life.

00308

INSTRUCTION NO.
In determining any fact in this case you should not
consider nor be influenced by any statement made or act done
by the court which you may interpret as indicating its views
thereon.

You are the sole and final judges of all questions

of fact submitted to you, and you must determine such questions
for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you
believe the court thinks thereon.

The court has not intended

to express, or intimate, or be understood as giving any opinion on what the proof shows or does not show, or what are or
what are not the facts in the case.
the court thinks thereon.

And it is immaterial what

You must follow your own views and

not be influenced by the views of the court.
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A P P E A R A N C E S

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

NICHOLAS D'ALESANDRO
DEPUTY S.L. DISTRICT ATTORNEY
231 EAST 4TH SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
FOR THE DEFENDANT:
SCOTT WILLIAMS
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOC.
424 EAST FIFTH SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

2
MAY 2 6 ,

2000

SALT

LAKE C I T Y ,

UTAH

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

MR. WILLIAMS.

MR. WILLIAMS:
991919507.

JUAN QUITERIO PEREZ, NUMBER.

HE'S IN CUSTODY.

THE COURT:

NUMBER 23.

VERY WELL.

JUAN Q. PEREZ, 99-9507.

STATE OF UTAH VS,

MR. WILLIAMS, YOU'RE

APPEARING FOR THIS DEFENDANT.
MR. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

YES, YOUR HONOR.

MR. D'ALESANDRO, YOU'RE HERE

FOR THE STATE?
MR. D'ALESANDRO:
THE COURT:

I AM, YOUR HONOR.

YOU ARE.

OH, EXCUSE ME, WE

HAVE MS. UPDEGROVE HERE AS THE INTERPRETER.

I WILL

ASK YOU ONE MORE TIME TO TAKE THE OATH,
MS. UPDEGROVE.
(GLORIA UPDEGROVE SWORN AS INTERPRETER.)
THE COURT:

THANK YOU, MS. UPDEGROVE.

YOU ARE JUAN QUITERIO PEREZ; IS THAT
CORRECT?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

YES.

AND YOU ARE REPRESENTED HERE BY

YOUR LAWYER, MR. WILLIAMS; IS THAT CORRECT?
THE DEFENDANT:

YES.

A
THE COURT:

THIS MATTER IS ON THE CALENDAR

INCIDENT TO SENTENCING.

THE DEFENDANT WAS TRIED

BEFORE A JURY ON THE 19TH OF APRIL OF THIS YEAR,
WHICH RENDERED GUILTY VERDICTS IN THE TWO CHARGES,
AGGRAVATED

BURGLARY, A 1ST DEGREE FELONY, AND

ATTEMPTED MURDER, A 2ND DEGREE FELONY.
A PRESENTENCE REPORT WAS ORDERED AND HAS
NOW BEEN RECEIVED AND REVIEWED.

MR. WILLIAMS, YOU

HAVE SEEN THE REPORT, HAVE YOU NOT?
MR. WILLIAMS:
THE COURT:

YES, YOUR HONOR.

THERE IS ANY LEGAL REASON KNOWN

TO YOU WHY I SHOULD NOT IMPOSE SENTENCE TODAY?
MR. WILLIAMS:

NO LEGAL REASON, THOUGH I DO

WANT TO RENEW A LEGAL MOTION RELEVANT TO SENTENCING,
BEFORE THE SENTENCING.

BUT I THINK THAT AFTER THAT

MOTION, REGARDLESS OF WHICH WAY YOUR HONOR RULES ON
IT, THAT THE SENTENCING COULD PROCEED TODAY LEGALLY.
THE COURT:

DID YOU FILE A WRITTEN MOTION?

MR. WILLIAMS:
OCCASIONS.

IT HAS BEEN FILLED ON TWO

I JUST WANT TO MAKE SURE ON THE RECORD

HERE AT THE SENTENCING, YOUR HONOR, THAT I RENEW MY
REQUEST FOR YOUR HONOR TO MERGE THESE COUNTS
PURSUANT TO THE ARGUMENTS.
THE CASES I SUPPLIED TO THIS COURT, AND TO
JUDGE ATHERTON IN SUPPORT OF THAT IN MY ARGUMENTS ON

1

MERGER OF THE COUNTS IN FACT INCLUDES SCENARIOS THAT

2

ARE POST-JUDGMENT SCENARIOS.

3

POST-JUDGEMENT, AND THE FIRST TIME THE ARGUMENTS ARE

4

MADE IS AT SENTENCING.

5

THE APPEALS ARE

IN MY CASE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT I MADE THE

6

MOTION PRIOR TO SENTENCING.

HOWEVER, I WANT TO BE

7

SURE ON THE RECORD THAT I MAKE IT HERE AT

8

SENTENCING, AS WELL, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE

9

INTERVENING TRIAL AND THE FACT THAT THE CASE WAS

10

PRESENTED AGAIN AT TRIAL, AND ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF

11

THE FACT THAT BY AGREEMENT OF THE STATE - - I N FACT I

12

THINK -- OR AT LEAST WITHOUT OBJECTION AS PER THE

13

JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS CASE, THE CASE WAS

14

SUBMITTED TO THE JURY ON ONLY THE THEORIES OF

15

AGGRAVATED BURGLARY AND AGGRAVATED

16

ATTEMPTED MURDER, THAT I RELIED ON IN MY MERGER

17

ARGUMENT INITIALLY.

18

-- I'M SORRY,

SO IN OTHER WORDS, IT'S NOT LIKE SOMETHING

19

ELSE HAPPENED AT THE TRIAL THAT RAN CONTRARY TO MY

20

ARGUMENTS THAT WERE MADE PRETRIAL ON THE MERGER

21

ISSUE.

22

FACTS DEVELOPED AT TRIAL AND THE WAY IT WAS GIVEN TO

23

THE JURY ACTUALLY FURTHER SUPPORTS THE MERGER

24

ARGUMENT.

25

BEFORE YOUR HONOR TODAY.

AND IN FACT IT'S MY BELIEF THAT THE WAY THE

SO I WANT TO MAKE SURE AND RENEW IT

1

THE COURT:

OKAY.

MR. WILLIAMS, I'M NOT

2

PURSUADED THIS IS A CASE WHERE MERGER OUGHT TO HAVE

3

TAKEN PLACE.

4

THE MOTION IS DENIED.

MY RULING, THEREFORE, WILL STAND, AND

5

MR. WILLIAMS:

6

THE COURT:

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

NOW THAT'S RESOLVED, YOU SAY

7

THERE'S NO OTHER REASON YOU HAVE, NO LEGAL REASON,

8

WHY WE SHOULDN'T PROCEED AT THIS TIME?

9

MR. WILLIAMS:

10

THE COURT:

THAT'S CORRECT.

ALL RIGHT.

BEFORE I PROCEED

11

WITH SENTENCING/ DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY IN

12

BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT.

13

I

MR. WILLIAMS:

BRIEFLY.

THE REASON IT'S

14

BRIEF I'M SURE WILL BE OBVIOUS TO THE COURT.

15

COURT HEARD THE TRIAL, SO THERE'S NO NEED TO RELATE

16

THE FACTS.

17

THIS

AND MR. PEREZ HAS MAINTAINED HIS INNOCENCE,

18

CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN IT.

19

HIM, IT'S MY FEELING THAT ANY DRAWN-OUT AMOUNT OF

20

ARGUMENT OR REQUEST FOR PROBATION WILL BE FUTILE.

21

AND AS I HAVE

INFORMED

WHAT I'LL DO IS REQUEST YOUR HONOR, IF YOU

22

THOUGHT OR COULD HAZARD ANY SUGGESTION THERE'S A

23

PROBABILITY OF PROBATION, I WOULD BE HAPPY TO

24

RESPOND IN ANY AREA THAT YOU MAY HAVE A QUESTION

25

ABOUT.

1

OTHERWISE, I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THERE

2

IS 236 DAYS OF INCARCERATION ON THIS CASE AND

3

REQUEST THAT IF YOUR HONOR ORDERS COMMITTMENT TO

4

PRISON, THAT HE GET CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED.

5

THAT THE REALITY OF THAT IS UNLIKELY TO AFFECT THE

6

SENTENCE, BUT WE WOULD ASK FOR CREDIT FOR TIME

7

SERVED.

8

THE COURT:

9

I THINK

THANK YOU, MR. WILLIAMS.

BEFORE I DECIDE WHAT TO DO HERE, MR. PEREZ, DO YOU

10

WISH TO SAY ANYTHING?

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

THE COURT:

NO.

VERY WELL.

LET ME INQUIRE:

13

MR. D'ALESANDRO, DO WE HAVE THE VICTIM OR VICTIM

14

REPRESENTATIVE HERE WHO WISHES TO BE HEARD?

15

HOWELL, DO YOU WISH TO SPEAK, MA'AM, AT THIS TIME?

16

I

17
18
19

MS. HOWELL:

NO.

THE COURT:

OKAY.

THANK YOU.

MS.

DOES THE

STATE HAVE ANYTHING TO ADD IN THIS MATTER,
I

20 I

MR. D'ALESANDRO?
MR. D'ALESANDRO:

YOUR HONOR,

FRANKLY,

21

THERE'S NOT MUCH TO ADD TO THE PRESENTENCE REPORT.

22

THE COURT HAVING HEARD THE EVIDENCE, YOU'RE WELL

23

AWARE OF WHAT I WOULD CONSIDER TO BE THE EGREGIOUS

24

CONDUCT IN THIS CASE.

25

THIS INDIVIDUAL, BASED ON THE CONDUCT AND

1

HIS INABILITY TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS

2

OFFENSE IN TERMS OF A SERIOUS THREAT TO THIS

3

COMMUNITY, AND I WOULD ASK THE COURT TO FOLLOW THE

4

PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION RECOMMENDATIONS, WHICH IT

5

SEEMS TO ME TO BE APPROPRIATE IN THIS MATTER.

6

THE COURT:

THERE BEING NO LEGAL REASON WHY

7

I SHOULD NOT IMPOSE SENTENCE, I WILL DO THAT AT THIS

8

TIME.

9

MR. PEREZ, HAVING HEARD THE EVIDENCE AT THE

10

TRIAL, I AM PERSUADED THAT THE JURY VERDICT WAS

11

CORRECT, THAT, INDEED, MR. PEREZ, THE CONDUCT IN

12

WHICH YOU ENGAGED WAS -- EGREGIOUS,! I GUESS IS AN

13

APPROPRIATE TERM.

14

HOME IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT AND STABBING HER

15

WITH A KNIFE, WHICH OF COURSE IS WHAT THE JURY FOUND

16

YOU GUILTY OF HAVING DONE, IN MY ESTIMATION IN THIS

17

CIVILIZED SOCIETY CANNOT AND WILL NOT BE TOLERATED,

18

MR. PEREZ.

19

BREAKING INTO A LITTLE LADY'S

THEREFORE, IT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

20

OF THIS COURT THAT YOU BE COMMITTED TO THE UTAH

21

STATE PRISON FORTHWITH TO SERVE THE TERM PROVIDED BY

22

LAW FOR THE FIRST DEGREE FELONY OF FIVE YEARS TO

23

LIFE, AND FOR THE SECOND DEGREE FELONY OF ONE TO 15

24

YEARS, AND THAT THOSE TERMS BE SERVED CONSECUTIVELY

25

AND NOT CONCURRENTLY.

1

AS I AM BOUND TO DO, I WILL GRANT YOU

2

CREDIT FOR THE 236 DAYS THAT YOU HAVE SPENT IN

3

CUSTODY AWAITING DISPOSITION IN THESE MATTERS.

4

WILL ORDER THAT YOU PAY RESTITUTION IN THE AMOUNT OF

5

$500, WHICH IS WHAT IS NOW KNOWN, AND THAT YOU PAY

6

RECOUPMENT FEE FOR THE SERVICES OF YOUR PUBLICALLY

7

PROVIDED LAWYER OF $750.

8

WORTH MORE THAN THAT, MR. WILLIAMS, BUT I THINK

9

THAT'S PROBABLY AN APPROPRIATE NUMBER.

I

I KNOW YOUR SERVICES ARE

IF THERE IS

10

NOTHING FURTHER, COUNSEL, THAT WILL BE THE ORDER.

11

COMMITTMENT IS TO ISSUE FORTHWITH.

12 I

MR. WILLIAMS:

THERE WAS ONE THING I WOULD

13

LIKE TO MAKE A RECORD OF, AND I WOULD LIKE TO OBJECT

14

TO THE CONSECUTIVE.

15

CASE IT SEEMS VERY CLEAR THAT IT WAS A SINGLE

16

CRIMINAL EPISODE AND INVOLVEMENT OF MINUTES BY THE

17

ASSAILANT IN THIS CASE.

18

EVEN UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS

AND I DON'T THINK THAT THERE ARE ANY OTHER

19

AGGRAVATING FACTORS.

20 I

AT THE TIME.

21

REQUEST THAT YOU MODIFY AND ORDER THAT THEY RUN

22

CONCURRENT.

23

MR. PEREZ WASN'T ON PROBATION

AND WE WOULD ENTER AN OBJECTION AND

THE COURT:

MR. WILLIAMS, YOUR REQUEST IS

24

DENIED.

I VIEW THE ACTIVITIES OF THIS MAN TO BE

25

ESSENTIALLY TWO SEPARATE INCIDENTS.

HE BROKE INTO

m
THE PLACE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT.
USES A KNIFE TO STAB THE VICTIM.

AND THEN HE

THOSE, TO ME, ANY

WAY YOU CUT IT, ARE TWO SEPARATE CRIMES.
NOW, IF I WAS TO GRANT HIM CONCURRENT TERMS
AT THE PRISON YOUR ULTIMATE APPEAL WOULDN'T HAVE
NEAR THE POIGNANCY.

GOOD LUCK TO YOU.

MR. WILLIAMS:

THANK YOU.

THAT'S ALL I

HAVE.
THE COURT:

THANK YOU, MR. WILLIAMS

(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED.)

1

C E R T I F I C A T E

2

STATE OF UTAH

3

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE :

4

:

I, GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND

5

REPORTER AND REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTER IN THE

6

STATE OF UTAH HEREBY CERTIFY:

7
8
9
10
11

THAT I AM AN OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER IN THE
THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH;
THAT I WAS PRESENT DURING THE ENTIRE
PROCEEDINGS IN THE BEFORE-ENTITLED CAUSE;
THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WERE REPORTED

12

STENOORAPHICALLY

13

TRANSCRIBED.

14

BY MB, AND WERE

THEREAFTER

THAT SAID TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTES TO THE

15

BEST OF MY ABILITY A TRUE AND COMPLETE RECORD OF THE

16

PROCEEDINGS HAD.

17

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I HAVE SUBSCRIBED MY

18 I NAME AND SEAL THIS 20TH DAY OF JUNE, 2000.
19
20

—>^^^-{^^L^___

21 \

GAYLE B. CAMPBELL,

22
23
24
25

CSR, RPR

12.
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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